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THE ELASTIC TOURNAMENT: A SECOND
TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM
Marc Galanter* and William Henderson**
In 1991, Galanter and Palay published Tournament of Lawyers: The
Transformation of the Big Law Firm, which documented the regular and
relentless growth of large US law firms. The book advanced several structural
and historical factors to explain these patterns, centering on the adoption of the
promotion-to-partnership tournament. Systemic changes in the marketplace for
corporate legal services in the intervening years suggest the need for an updated
account of the modem large law firm.
Using Tournament of Lawyers as a starting point, we propose to fill this
void in the literature. Marching through a wide array of empirical evidence
covering the last twenty to thirty years, our findings corroborate some of the core
theoretical insights of Tournament of Lawyers. For example, the continuous
upward growth of the partnership based on the tournament is clearly evidenced
by a "smooth " upward trajectory in the partnership ranks while associate hiring
hews more closely to the underlying business cycle. On the other hand, the
widening ranks of nonequity partnership and permanent "off track" attorneys
suggest the emergence of a more complex and elongated tournament structure
that applies to both partners and associates. Further, the sheer size and
geographic dispersion of present-day large law firms makes it more difficult to
create and sustain firm-wide cultural norms, such as collegiality, cooperation,
and risk sharing, that may have moderated intrafirm competition under the
original "classic" tournament.
Under this new model, which we dub "elastic tournament, " the equity core
is reserved primarily for partners who control access to key clients. This
structure reduces cross-subsidies between lawyers with differential value to the
firm, thus reducing the potential for large-scale lateral defections. In this highly
atomized environment, individual lawyers within large firms are likely to find it
harder to adhere to professional and ethics principles that are at odds with a
* John and Rylla Bosshard Professor Emeritus at the University of Wisconsin Law
School and Centennial Professor at the London School of Economics and Political Science.
** Associate Professor, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; Director,
Law Firms Working Group (American Bar Foundation/Indiana Law). Some of the data used
in this Article was made available pursuant to a special licensing agreement between the
American Bar Foundation and American Lawyer Media (ALM). The authors would also like
to thank workshop participants at the following law schools for their valuable comments:
Colorado, Emory, Georgetown, Harvard, Indiana, Illinois, Stanford and USC.
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client's objectives. As a result, zealous advocacy thus becomes of the touchstone
of ethical lawyering. Further, notwithstanding its formidable size, the 'firm"
itself has remarkably little autonomy to pursue noneconomic objectives, such as
racial and gender diversity or the training and mentoring of the next generation
of lawyers. Although the partnership shares the benefits of successful recruitment,
the lack of credible risk sharing reduces the willingness of individual lawyers to
invest in firm-wide initiatives that do not simultaneously optimize their own
practice. Except in a handful of exceptional cases, we fear that the mediating
influence of firm culture is likely to be eroded by the sheer size of the modern
large firm. Similar to any commodity market, this model is fundamentally
"stable" in the economic sense. Yet, it raises several philosophical and practical
issues regarding lawyer independence and the long-term viability ofprofessional
self-regulation.
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INTRODUCTION
Periodically law students, faculty, and practitioners come together to
reflect on the issues and problems affecting the legal profession. We welcome
the opportunity to take part in this discussion under the auspices of the Stanford
Center on Ethics. One way to organize this discussion is to focus on lawyers'
practice settings. According to the most recent edition of The Lawyer Statistical
Report,' which contains data for the year 2000, 672,901 lawyers (74%) worked
1. CLARA N. CARSON, THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT: THE U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION
IN 2000, at 6 tbl.6 (2004). This is a serial publication of the American Bar Foundation, which
compiles the data on a regular five-year cycle. The following table summarizes lawyers by
practice setting:
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in private practice. Of these lawyers, slightly less than half (324,903) worked as
sole practitioners (but there is clear evidence that this portion is shrinking).2
Among the remaining 347,998 private practice lawyers in the United States,
slightly more than a quarter (95,892) worked in law firms with 101 or more
attorneys. In total, large law firm lawyers comprised 10.5% of the U.S. legal
profession. Yet this is the fastest-growing, most prosperous, and most dynamic
sector of the profession. If the recent past is a reliable guide, the institution of
the large law firm-its power, influence, and prestige-will once again be a
dominant theme in this discussion.
3
More than in earlier times, however, this emphasis may be especially
justified. Over the last three decades, an increasing proportion of law school
graduates are beginning their careers in large law firms. Based on the size of
All Lawyers in U.S. (2000) U.S. Lawyers in Private Practice (2000)
Practice Setting # % Firm Size # %
Private Practice 672,901 74.0% Solo Practitioners 324,903 48.3%
Federal Gov't 31,780 3.5% 2 to 5 Lawyers 99,235 14.7%
State & Local 60,953 6.7% 6 to 10 Lawyers 45,549 6.8%
Private or Non-
Profit Sector 81,673 9.0% 11 to 20 Lawyers 40,108 6.0%
Legal Aid or Public
Defender 9,057 1.0% 21 to 50 Lawyers 40,936 6.1%
Education 9,041 1.0% 51 to 100 Lawyers 26,279 3.9%
Retired/Inactive 43,614 4.8% 101+ Lawyers 95,892 14.3%
Total 909,019 100.0% Total 672,902 100.0%
Source: Calculated from The Lawyer Statistical Report (2004), tbls.8 & 11
2. See id. at 7 tbl.7 (showing the proportion of attorneys in solo private practice
declining from 64% in 1960 to 48% in 2000). In urban areas, the decline in solo practice is
even more pronounced. See JoHN P. HEINZ ET AL., URBAN LAWYERS: THE NEW STRUCTURE
OF THE BAR 100-01 & fig.5.1 (2005) (reviewing evidence that the proportion of solo
practitioners in Chicago diminished from 21% to 15% between 1975 and 1995).
3. See, e.g., Conference on the Commercialization of the Legal Profession, 45 S.C. L.
REV. 875 (1994) (two of four articles focus on large law firms); Symposium, Empirical
Studies of the Legal Profession: What Do We Know About Lawyers Lives?, 84 N.C. L. REV.
1415 (2006) (six out of eight articles focus on large law firms); Symposium, The Future of
the Legal Profession, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 333 (1994) (all seven articles focus on large
corporate firms or using them as a point of contrast). Recognizing their disproportionate
influence (and, presumably, their appeal to aspiring lawyers), many symposia specifically
focus on large law firms. See, e.g., Symposium, Attorney Well-Being in Large Firms:
Choices Facing Young Lawyers, 52 VAND. L. REV. 869 (1999); Stein Center Conference:
Professional Challenges in Large Law Firm Practices, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1 (2005);
Symposium on the Corporate Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REV. 271 (1985); Symposium, The
Growth of Large Law Firms and lts Effect on the Legal Profession and Legal Education, 64
IND. L.J. 421 (1989); cf RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 182 (1989) (reporting that
as of 1980, only 9.2% of lawyers worked in law firms with more than twenty lawyers, yet
"such firms have become the most conspicuous feature in the American legal landscape").
4. See, e.g., HEINZ ET AL., supra note 2, at 144 fig.6.2 (reporting that in 1975, 5% of
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the 2007 summer-associate classes, The American Lawyer magazine estimates
that the nation's two hundred largest law firms (based on revenue) are set to
hire ten thousand entering associates during the fall of 2008. 5 "That astonishing
number," observes editor-in-chief Aric Press, "equals about one-quarter of all
the students who will graduate from U.S. law schools next year. To put it
another way, the top 20 law schools will only produce about 6,500 graduates."
6
Because virtually all large law firms still aspire to some variant of the original
"Cravath system," in which the firm establishes its brand by hiring only the
best students from the best law schools and providing them with the best
training,7 the laws of supply and demand dictate that thousands of entry-level
associates now command the princely sum of $160,000 per year.8 By
extension, elite and semi-elite law schools are able to take a proportionate share
through ever-higher tuition (and corresponding debt loads), without "billing"
any additional hours or changing the way they (we) teach.9
The partner-owners of large law firms have also benefited, at least
financially. A persistent multidecade surge in demand for corporate legal
services,10 has given partners in large law firms dramatic gains in their
compensation, especially in comparison to their counterparts in small and solo
Chicago lawyers commenced their careers at a firm of one hundred or more lawyers,
compared to 19% in 1995); RONIT DINOVITZER ET AL., AFTER THE JD: FIRST RESULTS OF A
NATIONAL STUDY OF LEGAL CAREERS 25-27 & tbl.3.1 (2004) (reporting that 28% of recent
law school graduates works in large firms (>100) compared to 8% of all lawyers).
5. Aric Press, The New Reality, Am. LAW., Aug. 2007, at 91.
6. Id.
7. See MILTON C. REGAN JR., EAT WHAT You KILL: THE FALL OF A WALL STREET
LAWYER 22-23 (2005) (discussing how recruitment and training of Cravath associates was
an "attempt[ ] to establish a distinctive brand in the legal services marketplace" and thus set
it "apart from its potential competitors"); Lawrence J. Fox, The End of Partnership, 33
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 245, 245 (2005) (noting as a law firm partner that large firms perpetuate
the myth that they only interview at "the very best schools and seek to recruit the very best
law students").
8. Press, supra note 5.
9. William D. Henderson & Andrew P. Morriss, Student Quality as Measured by LSAT
Scores: Migration Patterns in the U.S. News Rankings Era, 81 IND. L.J. 163, 195 (2005)
(discussing how higher salaries accompanying higher debt loads at elite schools result in "an
effective transfer [of wealth] from the large firms (and so from their clients) to elite and
semi-elite law schools"); see also Randolph N. Jonakait, The Two Hemispheres of Legal
Education and the Rise and Fall of Local Law Schools, 51 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 863, 864-65
(2007) (discussing deleterious consequences of local law schools trying to emulate elite
counterparts without the lifeblood of large firm jobs).
10. See HEINZ ET AL., supra note 2, at 287 (attributing large law firm size to greater
corporate demand and positing several likely explanations); John P. Heinz, Robert L. Nelson
& Edward 0. Laumann, The Scales of Justice: Observations on the Transformation of Urban
Law Practice, 27 ANN. REV. Soc. 337, 342 (2001) (same); Randall S. Thomas, Stewart J.
Schwab & Robert G. Hansen, Megafirms, 80 N.C. L. REV. 115, 136-52 (2001) (same); see
also Marc Galanter, Planet of the APs: Reflections on the Scale of Law and Its Users, 53
BUFF. L. REV. 1369 (2006) (noting increasing share of corporations as consumers of legal
services).
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practice. 1 Nonetheless, because of the relentless pace of modem large law firm
practice, there are few (if any) partners who regard the present as a golden era
of professional felicity. In a recent column in the alumni magazine, Larry
Kramer, the dean of Stanford Law School, reviewed the many changes in large
law firm practice, including soaring billable hour expectations, the resistance of
clients to paying for associate training, the explosion of lateral hiring,
unprecedented associate attrition, and a diminution in the sense of firm culture
and community. 12 Kramer then queries, "Does anyone actually want this? The
lawyers, managing partners, and general counsels I meet are deeply concerned
about what's happening. Yet they feel unable to stop it, powerless to resist the
stifling market forces that drive their decisions." 
1 3
In light of the disproportionate sway and influence of large law firms-and
a widespread perception among law students, faculty, and practitioners that we
are being pulled into new and uncharted territory-the time is ripe for an
updated and more contemporary account of the modem large law firm.
Drawing on recent empirical evidence, we observe that the well-known
"promotion-to-partner tournament" remains a core feature of large U.S. law
firms. 14 However, the new model, which we dub the "elastic tournament,"
involves a different set of ground rules and ultimately includes a much larger
(and mostly older) set of players in more roles. Moreover, until a large law firm
lawyer renounces any interest in prerogatives of ownership (e.g., a claim on
residual profits, a voice in firm management), the duration of the tournament
can now be expected to last one's entire career. In short, the only finish line is
11. See, e.g., HEINZ ET AL., supra note 2, at 166-67 & fig.7.2 (reporting declines, from
1975 to 1995, in real income for equity partners in firms of two to one hundred lawyers but a
44% rise within firms of 101 to 299 lawyers and "the highest incomes of all" among partners
in largest firms); William D. Henderson, Financial and Billing Survey of ISBA Lawyers,
Presentation to Indiana State Bar Association Solo & Small Firm Conference (June 1, 2007)
(on file with author) (reporting linear relationship between firm size and growth in real
income over the last five years).
12. Larry Kramer, From the Dean, STAN. LAW., Fall 2007, at 1.
13. Id. One Stanford Law alumnus referred to Kramer's observations as "nonsense on
stilts." See Adam Smith, Esq., http://www.bmacewen.com/blog (Oct. 31, 2007, 11:57 EST).
However, the alumnus works as management consultant to law firms.
14. See MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM 99-102 (1991). During the last fifteen years, the
promotion-to-partner tournament has provoked a lively and provocative literature. See, e.g.,
Marc Galanter & Thomas Palay, A Little Jousting About the Big Law Firm Tournament, 84
VA. L. REV. 1683 (1998); Bruce M. Price, How Green Was My Valley? An Examination of
Tournament Theory as a Governance Mechanism in Silicon Valley Law Firms, 37 LAW &
Soc'Y REV. 731 (2003); David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Reconceiving the Tournament
of Lawyers: Tracking, Seeding, and Information Control in the Internal Labor Market of
Elite Law Firms, 84 VA. L. REV. 1581 (1998); Frederick W. Lambert, An Academic Visit to
the Modern Law Firm: Considering a Theory of Promotion-Driven Growth, 90 MICH. L.
REV. 1719 (1992) (book review); Kevin A. Kordana, Note, Law Firms and Associate
Careers: Tournament Theory Versus the Production-Imperative Model, 104 YALE L.J. 1907,
1923-33 (1995).
April 2008]
STANFORD LA W RE.VIE W
death or retirement.
These changes are driven by a confluence of factors, including firm size,
geographic dispersion, client demands, lower information costs via technology,
and shifting generational tastes.15 Yet, the fundamental economic reality that
underlies this transformation is the inability of large law firms to underwrite a
prize of partnership that includes both long-term financial security and eventual
repose.' At the same time that large law firms have grown to truly behemoth
proportions, aided in part by a large cadre of professional lawyer-managers, the
locus of firm control has shifted to an inner core of "partners with power"'
17
who may or may not be strongly wedded to the firm. ffLarge law firms that
refuse to privilege these partners inevitably run the risk of large-scale defection
and implosion.1
This Article is organized in three parts. In Part I, we discuss the key
features of the new "elastic" tournament model. In Part II, we assess the
accuracy of the elastic tournament model by reviewing the empirical evidence.
In the process, we note the emergence of a separating dynamic in which large
general service law firms without an optimal mix of lucrative practice
specialties will soon be vanquished in the salary wars.20 We speculate that
these less-endowed firms may form the basis for new and distinct second tier of
large law firms that will compete on the basis of specialized service and price
rather than elite lawyer credentials. Finally, in Part III, we consider three
implications of our model: (a) with reduced risk sharing among partners, large
law firm lawyers will be less independent of their clients and thus less reliable
exemplars of professional ethics; (b) the atomistic ethos of modem large firm
practice is likely to hinder the profession's aspiration to gender and racial parity
15. See infra Part II.
16. Drawing upon the framework developed by Gilson and Mnookin, this outcome has
occurred because of the erosion of "firm-specific" capital. In earlier years, clients were
strongly wedded to specific law firms, due in part to high switching costs for clients and to
professional norms that discouraged mobility. As a result, corporate law firms could credibly
offer entry-level associates the prospect of lifetime employment. See Ronald J. Gilson &
Robert H. Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human Capitalists: An Economic Inquiry into the
Corporate Law Firm and How Partners Split Profits, 37 STAN. L. REv. 313, 353-71 (1985)
(discussing advantages and sources of firm-specific capital).
17. ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER: SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE
LARGE LAW FIRM 5 (1988) (observing that "the organizational rationalization of the firm will
be controlled by the partners with power," which is "inextricably tied to 'control of
clients').
18. Cf REGAN, supra note 7, at 37 (noting "the irony: large firms a generation ago
were loosely organized but tightly integrated, while today's firms are more formally
organized but only loosely integrated.").
19. See William D. Henderson, An Empirical Study of Single-Tier Versus Two-Tier
Partnerships in the Am Law 200, 84 N.C. L. REv. 1691, 1742-44 & nn.188-89 (2006)
(discussing instability of firms that permit cross-subsidies between productive and
nonproductive partners).
20. Press, supra note 5 ("[T]here is a price point [for associate salaries] that not all Am
Law 200 firms will be willing to match. We're confident that that number begins with a 2.").
1_872 [Vol. 60:1867
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at the partnership level; and (c) the new generation of "millennial" lawyers will
get their wish of greater work-life balance 2 1 in exchange for an expanded array
of "off track" career options. Nonetheless, similar to earlier generations,22 we
suspect that a large number of the best and brightest will continue to be drawn
into the tournament by the money and status that come with making partner.
I. AN UPDATED TOURNAMENT: A NEW MODEL OF LARGE LAW FIRM GROWTH
The promotion-to-partner tournament has been a defining feature of large
corporate law firms since their emergence on the legal scene in the late
nineteenth century.23 The basic scheme of the tournament was that lawyers
blessed with more work than they could personally handle would recruit highly
qualified but inexperienced young graduates of the newly flourishing law
schools, which were displacing "reading law" as the preferred entryway to the
profession. The partners would hire these young lawyers to work on the cases
of the firm, a manifestation of the human capital of the senior lawyers, under
the supervision of those seniors. After an extended probationary period marked
by increasing responsibility, the most proficient of these associates (as they
came to be called in the early twentieth century) would, be taken into the
partnership. Under the "up or out" principle, the others departed and were
replaced by new recruits. Promotion marked the point at which the young
lawyer had accumulated more human capital than could be combined with his
own labor. So when an associate was taken into the partnership, the firm
needed not only to replace him, but also to add sufficient labor power to utilize
the additional increment of human capital. In this scheme the partnerships of
successful firms, consisting of those who won the tournament, would grow
gradually over time. Growth was internal, generated by the tournament. Apart
from the departure of associates who did not become partners, there was
virtually no lateral movement in or out of the firm. Partners enjoyed a kind of
tenure and remained with their firms for the course of their working lives. The
successful tournament firm can be schematically represented as an inverted
21. See, e.g., Marisa McQuilken, Students Seek a More Reasonable Law Firm Life-
Before They Even Start, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 3, 2007, at 26 (discussing how several Stanford
Law students organized "Law Students Building a Better Legal Profession" in reaction to a
"law firm culture bereft of work-life balance").
22. For example, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, law students pressed corporate law
firms for progressive reforms remarkably similar to the current generation. See Ralph Nader,
Law School and Law Firms, 54 MiNN. L. REV. 493, 497-500 (1970) (discussing how students
"have considerable leverage" and that "[w]hatever the outcome, the big firms will never be
the same").
23. See generally GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 14. Of course, the definition of
"large" has continuously changed as the size of the largest units has grown. One recent story
asserted that midsized firms "range from 180 to 500 attorneys firmwide." Lynne Marek,
Chicago's Midsize Firms Look to Stay Independent, NAT'L L.J., July 9, 2007, at 10.
Applying this definition to the 2007 NLJ 250, 84 U.S.-based law firms are large (i.e., more
than 500 lawyers), 151 are midsized (180 to 500), and 15 are small.
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Figure 1. Inverted Funnel: The Early (Classical) Tournament Firm
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With minor variations, this was the shape of virtually all large American
law firms providing legal services for organizational clients over the course of
the last century. These firms grew over time; their style of work became the
industry standard for provision of complex and continuing legal services. 24 The
tournament firm successfully adapted to changes in technology, to a great
enlargement in scale, and to diversification of its personnel.25 And after World
War II, and especially toward the end of the century, it became a model
adopted in many countries around the world. 26 It is widely viewed as a
24. See, e.g., Peter D. Sherer, Leveraging Human Assets in Law Firms: Human Capital
Structures and Organizational Capabilities, 48 INDus. & LAB. REL. REV. 671, 672-75 (1995)
(discussing the evolution and success of the large law firm and attributing core features to
the widespread adoption of the "Cravath Model").
25. See generally GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 14, at 37-76 (reviewing how the
tournament structure adapted to a wide range of systemic changes that affected the legal
profession).
26. See, e.g., Marc Galanter & Simon Roberts, From Kinship to Magic Circle: The
London Commercial Law Firm in the 20th Century (Aug. 6, 2007) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author) (chronicling the adoption of the U.S. tournament model by British
solicitors in the middle decades of the twentieth century).
1874
funnel.
Soloctin I oveotion to
pamner-ower
THE ELASTIC TOURNAMENT
successful and stable form. 2 7 For most of its inhabitants and spectators it has
been naturalized; it is the unsurprising and expected form of organizing legal
work.
As firms grew and their surroundings changed, firms underwent a
transformation, beginning in the 1970s. Removal of restraints on the flow of
information made them more visible to media, public, clients, other firms and
themselves. Clients and lawyers became more mobile, as long-term retainer
relationships with clients gave way and the lifetime commitment of lawyers to
firms was threatened by the lateral movement of lawyers. Firms adapted to
these new fluidities by becoming more commercial and market-oriented,
embracing marketing and professional management. In response to the new
world of information and mobility, firms departed from equal shares
distribution to discourage or encourage lateral movement.
28
Developments in the past decade suggest a second and equally dramatic
transformation in the character of the tournament and in the shape of the firm
that it produces and that surrounds it. This transformation is the most drastic
and significant metamorphosis in the large law firm since the invention and
spread of the tournament firm in the closing years of the nineteenth century-a
transformation that portends major shifts in the way that legal services are
produced and delivered. It includes a number of discrete changes of
considerable importance:
* Liberalization of the traditional up-or-out principle (by retention of
"permanent associates' 29 and appointment of non-equity partners who
do not graduate to equity partnership);
30
27. See, e.g., Bryant G. Garth, Legal Education and Large Law Firms: Delivering
Legality or Solving Problems, 64 IND. L.J. 433, 433 (1989) ("Large law firms are the most
successful institutional component of the American legal profession according to the criteria
of economic prosperity, proximity to the corridors of economic and political power, and the
influence exerted on the legal profession generally."); Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 16, at
313, 386-89 (acknowledging inevitable changes in market for corporate legal services but
predicting continued growth and stability for the nation's largest firms); Robert L. Nelson,
Ideology, Practice, and Professional Autonomy: Social Values and Client Relationships in
the Large Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REV. 503, 545 (1985) ("[T]he large law firm has been
hugely successful as an economic enterprise, commanding increasingly larger proportions of
the revenues paid for private legal services and growing far more rapidly than the legal
profession as a whole.").
28. See generally GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 14, 37-76 (observing that in a more
competititive environment, firms respond to increased mobility by shifting from equal shares
and seniority as the basis of partner compensation to formulas that emphasize reward for
productivity and business-getting).
29. The lexicon for these non-partner positions is large. See, e.g., George P. Baker &
Rachel Parkin, The Changing Structure of the Legal Services Industry and the Careers of
Lawyers, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1635, 1641 n. 11 (2006) (analyzing the Martindale-Hubbell Law
Directory and classifying the following positions as "off-track": attorney, associate counsel,
counsel, consultant, of counsel, senior attorney, senior counsel, and special counsel).
30. For a detailed discussion of the advent, development, and incentive structures of
two-tiered partnerships, see Henderson, supra note 19, at 1699-713.
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* A growing share of non-tournament lawyers, such as of counsel, staff
lawyers, staff associates, contract lawyers, and lawyers at outsourced
locations, collaborating in the production of corporate legal services;
" Abandoning the equation of seniority with ownership and acceptance
of permanent employee status for lawyers. Previously, power and
standing were correlated with age; now they are not-a firm may have
a thirty-five-year-old equity partner and a sixty-year-old associate,
non-equity partner, or of counsel;
31
* Softening of the commitment of partnership as a permanent achieved
status-i.e., tenured-through de-equitization, outplacement,32 and
mandatory retirement;
3 3
* Acceptance of lateral inward movement (which depends on client
loyalty to lawyers rather than firms). 34 But firms still fear the departure
of rainmakers and stars;
3 5
* Acceptance of differentials in compensation and control that are not
based on seniority or election;
36
* Management becoming a separate function performed by specialists;
there are nonlawyer management auxiliaries like marketing director,
public relations, technology, etc.
37
31. As noted by Erwin Smigel in his seminal study of Wall Street law firms, "Custom
and power have ordained that the senior partners generally have the largest rooms ....
Courtesy and the recognition that inevitably everyone grows old guarantees that a very old
partner, no longer in power, retains his large office, even though he is not currently 'earning'
it." ERWIN 0. SMIGEL, TIrE WALL STREET LAWYER 209 (1969).
32. Cf Fox, supra note 7, at 247 ("[E]levation to partnership no longer comes with any
sense of tenure.... [Because of shifting norms,] law firms are now free, with little, if any,
guilt to ease out partners who are viewed as less than productive (productive being defined
by criteria that were far different from the standards that were applied when these folks were
admitted to the partnership .... )").
33. Although most large firms have mandatory retirement policies, a vibrant lateral
partner market is increasingly undercutting their intended effect. See Elizabeth Goldberg,
Desperately Seeking Seniors, AM. LAW., Sept. 2007, at 17.
34. See REGAN, supra note 7, at 34-35 (noting how firms have embraced the lateral
market as a way to acquire specialized lawyers or practice groups and that "an increasingly
large percentage of law firm partners are not associates who are promoted from within, but
arrivals from other firms"); Fox, supra note 7, at 248 (observing that a partner's true worth is
now determined by the lateral market).
35. See JOHN C. COFFEE JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 227 (2006) (reporting the "decline in law firm stability as 'star' attorneys
increasingly practice in a free agent market").
36. Compare REGAN, supra note 7, at 25 (reporting that promotion to partner formerly
denoted "a share of the firm's profits, a voice in the firm's governance, and considerable
independence from supervision by other lawyers"), with Fox, supra note 7, at 248 (noting
that "real partners" at any firm are "those whose books of business exceed a very significant
number-say a million, two million, or three, depending on the firm and the city").
37. See, e.g., REGAN, supra note 7, at 37 ("[T]oday's large firm has many more formal
organizational controls, such as hierarchical chain of command, more professional managers
in positions of authority, distinct practice departments, and detailed financial management
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With these changes we see the inverted-funnel shape of the classic early
tournament firm replaced by what we might call the core-mantle model of the
firm-a firm in which a core of owner-partners is surrounded by a much larger
mantle of employed lawyers that includes not only aspiring associates, but also
non-equity partners, permanent associates, of-counsel and de-equitized former
partners. We visualize this model two-dimensionally in Figure 2.
Figure 2. The Later "Core and Mantle" Tournament Firm
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We call this "later" form the "elastic tournament" since it involves a
stretching of the tournament so that it does not end with the promotion to
partnership, but instead becomes "perpetual" or unending as partners work
longer hours, accept differential rewards, and fear de-equitization or early,
forced retirement. 38 The core of owners is thinner compared to the early
classical model, and, arguably, its relative size vis-A-vis the rest of the firm is
and reporting systems," partially because "firms no longer are able to rely on informal social
norms to regulate behavior ... ").
38. See Henderson, supra note 19, at 1710 (noting empirical evidence of a "perpetual
tournament involving both associates and partners"); see also REGAN, supra note 7, at 37
(same).
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shrinking. 39 Further, there is more competition and tension within the firm.
Since the tournament is longer, thinner, and tenser, elastic seems a fitting
image.
Although large law firms, in the aggregate, continue to grow rapidly, there
appears to be a fair amount of volatility at the individual firm level. Of the 236
firms that made the National Law Journal 250 list in both 2006 and 2007, the
average number of partners (equity and non-equity) increased by an average of
ten partners per firm. Yet, remarkably, 58 firms (24.6%) reported a diminution
in the number of partners. The decline might result from one or more of several
factors, including a large cohort of retirees, the defection of an entire practice
group to another firm, 4 1 or systematic pruning of the partnership ranks. Indeed,
large-scale demotions or firings of partners have become commonplace. 42
When firm managers resort to this tool, what happens then? Does the
partnership recommence growth at the same rate as before? Or at a lower rate?
Or does it stay steady or even shrink while the mantle (non-core) grows? Figure
3 suggests some of the possible patterns of partnership size over time.
39. See infra notes 85-86 and accompanying text (discussing the rapid growth of non-
equity partners as the total number of equity partners leveled off).
40. For a statistical overview of the age-related demographics of the legal profession,
including the imminent retirement of a large number of boomer lawyers, see Marc Galanter,
"Old and In the Way": The Coming Demographic Transformation of the Legal Profession
and Its Implications for the Provision of Legal Services, 1999 Wis. L. REv. 1081, 1084-86
(presenting statistical evidence that the proportion of older (older than 50) to younger
(younger than 40) lawyers is increasing over time, with a sharp increase expected after
2005).
41. Drawing upon reports of group movement in a weekly newsletter distributed by
Hildebrandt International, Inc., we counted 249 instances of multi-lawyer movement
between January 2005 and May 2007, averaging 7.5 lawyers per multi-lawyer movement).
See HILDEBRANDT HEADLINES (Research & Analysis Group, Hildebrant In'l, Somerset, N.J.),
Jan. 2005-May 2007.
42. See infra Part II.A.
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Figure 3. Models of Transition from the Classical to the Later Tournament
A. Downward Kink in Growth
B. Drop and Recommencegrowth at same rate
C. Drop and Downward Kink
In Growth
D. Shrinking Partnership
E. Drop and Shrinking
Size of (Owner) Partnership over time
The transition involves the abandonment or downgrading of several norms
that once helped define the world of large law firms and a shift to norms that
intensify competition within the firm:
* The decline of the norm of age-graded equality among lawyers permits
differentiated compensation and hierarchy (such as two-tier
partnership) within firms;
* The decline of the norm of loyalty to the firm and immobility permits
lateral movement. A necessary concomitant is a decline of roughly
equal magnitude in client loyalty to the firm, because it is the shift of
attachment to individual lawyers that facilitates the lateral movement;
* The decline of the norm of confidentiality, secrecy, and reticence
permits the flow of information that enables interlawyer and interfirm
comparisons, which has been aided by the rise of the legal press.4 3 In
addition, sophisticated software enables detailed utilization and
realization comparisons on an intra-firm (office-by-office, practice
group-by-practice-group, lawyer-by-lawyer) level;
* The decline of the norm of priority of professional accomplishment
facilitates an emphasis on individual monetary and status rewards and
facilitates the measurement of firm standing by Profits Per equity-
Partner (PPP).
43. See GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 14, at 71 (discussing the birth of the legal
press in the aftermath of the Supreme Court's decision in Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433
U.S. 350 (1977)).
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In positing this shift in the character of the tournament and the shape of
firms, we acknowledge that it is not a single abrupt all-at-once transition, but a
more or less gradual process punctuated by smaller discrete changes (such as
the abandonment of lockstep compensation or the creation of non-equity
partnership). Nor do we claim that it holds throughout all tournament-based
firms. The observations on which we base our conclusions come from what
Heinz and Laumann called the "corporate hemisphere, ' 44 and, specifically,
only its higher peaks (represented in the Am Law 200 or NLJ 250). Nor do we
think the Late, or "Core and Mantle," Tournament is a destination or terminus
in the evolution of the large firm. We cannot identify a regime combining the
stability, repose, and gradual change of the sort that was for several generations
a feature of the Early Tournament.
Figure 4. Forces Driving Change Among Large Law Firms
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As depicted in Figure 4, several factors continue to shape the size, strategy,
and work conditions of the contemporary large law firms. During the 1970s, a
"new information order" resulted from the demise of the restraints on
information (about prices, salaries, profits, clients, available services, etc.),
sparked by judicial release from ethical constraints on communication and,
44. See JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD 0. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL
STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 319-33 (1982). We do not know whether there is an analogous
change within the personal services hemisphere.
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shortly thereafter, the emergence of a new, celebratory legal press.45 Over the
last three decades, this new flow of information has exposed clients to a wider
array of lawyers and has exposed lawyers to law firms that could potentially
offer them a larger share of profits. This disaggregation of corporate work
appears to have taken the shape of a "winner-take-all" market-a dynamic
most prevalent in entertainment and sports-in which the highest stakes
transactional and litigation work flows to the most capable practitioners.
46
Thus, a relatively small number of partners at the top of the hierarchy earn
disproportionately large rewards.
47
In their book, The Winner-Take-All Society, economists Robert Frank and
Phillip Cook argue that a wide array of professions now take this form,
primarily due to increased information flows from computer and
telecommunications technologies. 48 Law has been the site of spectacular
changes of this kind. The Early Tournament firm emerged in an era of new
office technologies-the typewriter, the telephone, the filing cabinet, the
elevator, and a proliferation of organized printed material-that enabled
lawyers to be more productive in servicing the demands of corporate clients.
4 9
From the emergence of the promotion-to-partnership firm until about 1960, the
office, research, and communication technology of law practice remained
largely unchanged. Then, in rapid succession, the firm's productivity, scope,
and scale were enlarged by photocopying, computers, jet air travel, faxing, the
Internet, and the myriad innovations that accompanied them.
Not surprisingly, in a globalized, market-driven world, flooded with
information and corresponding ignorance, there is a devouring appetite for
heuristics to manage that excess. Among the most popular devices is the
proliferation of publicized rank orderings of everything from pizza parlors to
45. See GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 14, at 70-73 (discussing the effect of Bates on
lawyers' willingness to share information).
46. The American Lawyer has contributed to the sweepstakes atmosphere through its
monthly Big Suits, Big Deals column, which culminates in an annual ranking of elite firms
and lawyers.
47. See generally ROBERT H. FRANK & PHILIP J. COOK, THE WtNNER-TAKE-ALL
SOCIETY (1995) (arguing that high incomes at the top have drawn too many talented people
into the legal profession). Longitudinal data from the Chicago Lawyers I and II data
provided tentative support for this claim, though primarily among practitioners with the
lowest concentrations of business clients. See Rebecca L. Sandefur & John P. Heinz,
Winner-Take-All Markets for Legal Services and Lawyers'Job Satisfaction (Am. Bar Found.
Working Paper No. 9906, 1999). This may be changing, however. Since 1995, when the
Chicago Lawyers II data was collected, profits per partner have risen dramatically for large
law firms, and fewer lawyers are making it into the equity tier. See infra Part II.
48. See FRANK & COOK, supra note 47, at 47 (asserting that "the most profound
changes in the underlying forces that give rise to winner-take-all effects have stemmed from
technological developments in two areas-telecommunications and electronic computing").
49. See GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 14, at 7-8 (reviewing how changes in
technology have consistently had large impacts on the organization and functioning of law
firms).
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brain surgeons. Among large law firms, the arrival of ranking has accentuated
and perhaps accelerated a shift in the economy of regard and prestige. The
search for honor has shifted from the accumulation of incommensurable
professional accomplishments to the currency of ranking in metrics of size,
profit, and income that signify importance, success, and power and are, at most,
indirectly correlated with achievements measured by avowed professional
values. Of course success and power have always played a role in professional
regard. But that role has become more prominent in a setting where they are
measured with supposed precision and where these rankings are privileged over
the less determinate and more recondite professional discourse. We shall see
the role of these rankings as both a mechanism and a driving force in the
ongoing transformation of the large law firm.
II. REVIEWING THE EVIDENCE OF A SECOND TRANSFORMATION
In Part I of this Article, we styled part of this process (from 1975 to the
present) as a story of transition from the "classic" to an "elastic" promotion-to-
partnership tournament. Part II chronicles a series of market developments over
the last three decades that corroborate our earlier claims. Subpart A provides
evidence that a confluence of reputational capital, firm strategy, and firm size
and dispersion has reshaped the promotion-to-partner tournament so that it
takes different forms according to a law firm's competitive position. Subpart B
examines how in almost all law firms two-tier partnerships have emerged as a
device to mitigate competitive pressures and preserve the promotion-to-
partnership tournament. Subpart C discusses the factors that have given rise to
the age of lawyer mobility. Finally, Subpart D suggests the emergence of a
separating dynamic based on a firm's mix of practice specialties and provides
evidence that this separation process is expedited by a linkage between the
elastic tournament and the associate salary wars.
A. Firm Size, Geography, and Competition
During the last three decades, large law firms have mushroomed in size
and geographic dispersion. Although the underlying growth in the total number
of lawyers is clearly driven by increases in the demand for legal services, the
law firm marketplace has itself undergone a significant structural
transformation. In earlier years, large corporate law firms competed primarily
on a regional basis and relied upon friendly networks of out-of-town firms to
oversee their clients' legal needs in other markets. With the proliferation of
branch offices, a large number of national and international law firms are
capable of competing for work that originates in a specific regional market. In
other words, there is more work for corporate lawyers, but the anticompetitive
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benefits of a localized guild have, in the process, been destroyed. 50 This
Section documents how firms with different levels of reputational capital have
adapted (rather than scuttled) the promotion-to-partnership tournament in
response to these structural changes.
As discussed earlier,5 1 the original promotion-to-partner tournament
implied the existence of a nonbinding but credible agreement between partners
and associates. By dint of technical skill, judgment, past results (we presume),
and the growth of corporate clientele, the owners of the firm had available to
them more legal work than they could perform personally. This surplus work
was thus performed by associates in exchange for a salary, mentorship, and the
prospect of partnership. At the end of some predetermined time period (usually
six to ten years),5 2 the prize of partnership was awarded to the associates who
had performed the best in terms of high-quality legal work and the production
of additional excess human capital. To entice maximal effort from associates,
and thus optimize its own financial interests, the firm committed itself to a
routinized and meritocratic promotion process. The nonsequential nature of the
agreement was mitigated by its relative transparency. Specifically, by
observing the treatment of preceding classes, an associate could verify that the
firm was making good on its commitment.
53
As noted in Tournament of Lawyers, because each newly promoted partner
requires the hiring of additional associates, the maintenance of the tournament
essentially commits the firm to a long-term pattern of perpetual growth. In the
years since its publication, this claim has come under heavy scrutiny.5 4 Yet, as
50. See Heinz, Nelson & Laumann, supra note 10, at 348-49. They argue that the
ascendancy of inside counsel reduced the practice of outside law firms referring cases to
friendly out-of-town firms and observe that "[slince Chicago firms were then no longer
dependent upon the goodwill of New York firms for referrals (and vice versa), there was less
reason to refrain from direct competition." See also HEINZ ET AL., supra note 2, at 299
(arguing the same).
51. See supra Part I.
52. See GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 14, at 100. In recent years, the average time
period to promotion has elongated. See Baker & Parkin, supra note 29, at 1670-72 & tbls.9
& 10 (reporting that between 1998 and 2003, the average time for promotion to partner for
all firms in the Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory increased from 9.13 to 9.65 years).
53. See Marc Galanter & Thomas Palay, The Many Futures of the Big Law Firm, 45
S.C. L. REv. 905, 909-12 (1994) (discussing mutually reinforcing economics that underlie
the promotion-to-partnership tournament); see also Leonard Bierman & Rafael Gely, So,
You Want to Be a Partner at Sidley & Austin?, 40 HoUs. L. REv. 969, 978-86 (2003)
(applying Internal Labor Market theory to a law firm partnership context and arguing that the
promise of long-term security as a partner can induce younger lawyers to make firm-specific
investments that benefit the firm).
54. See, e.g., supra note 14; see also George Rutherglen & Kevin A. Kordana, A
Farewell to Tournaments? The Need for an Alternative Explanation of Law Firm Structure
and Growth, 84 VA. L. REv. 1695, 1696 (1998) (arguing that the promotion-to-partnership
tournament has become "only one factor among many that contribute to the organizational
structure of the large law firm"); Robert L. Nelson, Of Tournaments and Transformations:
Explaining the Growth of Large Law Firms, 1992 Wis. L. REv. 733, 748-49 (book review)
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we step back and review the growth patterns of the nation's 250 largest firms
based on the number of lawyers (NLJ 250), in the aggregate the predicted
pattern of upward growth appears to hold true.
Figure 5. Growth of Large Law Firms / Persistence of Tournament
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As shown in Figure 5, each year since 1978, when the National Law
Journal first published the NLJ 250, the average (and total) number of partners
per firm has increased at a remarkably steady pace. 55 In contrast, the number of
associates appears to vary with the ebb and flow of the business cycle.
Yet, when the data is unpacked at the firm level, there is clearly much more
to law firm growth than the expansion required to maintain a viable promotion-
to-partner tournament. Among the 129 firms that appeared on the NLJ 250 in
both 1979 (the first year of publication) and 2007, the average change in the
number of partners ranged from +57% to +1782%. Although all of these large
firms continue to maintain a multiyear partnership track 56 and pay high entry-
level salaries, 57 they differ on several dimensions, including reputational
(suggesting that tournament theory does not fit all of the empirical data and suggesting the
need for other explanations).
55. Of course, the proliferation of the non-equity partnership is a significant
development, which we address shortly. See infra Part ll.B.
56. See generally NALP DIRECTORY OF LEGAL EMPLOYERS 2005-2006 (2005)
(providing detailed information on over six hundred corporate law firms, including the
length of the partnership track and whether the firm has a single or multi-tier partnership
structure).
57. For fiscal year 2006, the average starting salary in an NLJ 250 firm (weighted by
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capital, which in turn affects a firm's ability to attract desirable clientele and
recruit lawyers with strong qualifications. 58 Firms with large endowments of
reputational capital also have greater latitude in controlling the rate of firm
growth or alternatively pursuing a more aggressive long-term strategy.
To examine these dynamics, we generated a scatterplot of profits per equity
partner (FY 2005) and the natural log of the percent change in firm partnership
size between 1978 and 2006. 59 As shown by the best fit-lines in Figure 6, the
relationship between these two variables is best summarized as a quadratic
rather than a linear function (R2 of 0.261 versus 0.133). Following the U-
shaped quadratic fit-line, the sample can be divided into three stylized groups:
(1) strong reputation/slow growth firms (top left); (2) strong reputation/high
growth firms (top right); and (3) medium growth firms with lesser reputational
endowments (bottom middle). The firms are also delineated by tier structure
because, as an empirical matter, this attribute is strongly correlated with firm
prestige.
60
number of associates) was $131,400 with a standard deviation of $14,900. Calculation by
authors from data provided by the Law Firms Working Group.
58. Academic commentators and journalists often discuss large law firms as if they
comprise a single unitary category. In fact, different endowments of reputational capital are
associated with differences in clients, practice area concentrations, incentives for
specialization, recruitment strategies, utilization of non-equity partnership structures, hours
worked, and remuneration for associates and partners. See William D. Henderson & David
Zaring, Young Associates in Trouble, 105 MICH. L. REv. 1087, 1096-102 (2007) (book
review) (using multivariate regression and descriptive statistics to explore differences
between large firms).
59. We used the natural log of the growth rate based on our assumption that the
marginal benefits of growth taper off at higher levels. The comparison group here consists of
117 firms who appeared on the NLJ 250 in 1978 and 2007 (to calculate growth rate of
partnerships) and were listed on the Am Law 200 for fiscal year 2005 (to make financial
comparisons).
60. See Henderson, supra note 19, at 1728-29 & tbl.7 (summarizing data).
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Figure 6. Scatterplot of 2005 Fiscal Year PPP versus Natural Log of
Percentage Change in Partnership Size, 1978-2006
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Under this categorization, the first group (strong reputation/slow growth)
often occupies a dominant position in capital market specialties, such as
mergers and acquisitions or securities offerings. High levels of reputational
capital make it mutually advantageous for firm clients and partners to remain
with the firm.61 Because aggressive expansion outside this specialty area runs
the risk of diluting profits (through the promotion of partners who do less
lucrative work), the optimal strategy is to limit the rate of firm growth by
running a highly competitive and grueling tournament for a very lucrative
prize.62 Indeed, the ten slowest-growth firms appear to fit a distinct profile: (a)
all but one are based in New York City; (b) they tend to have fewer branch
offices and fewer total attorneys; 63 (c) they are highly profitable, with 2005
61. See Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 16, at 356 (opining that partners at firms with
high levels of reputational capital are less likely to make higher income elsewhere, thus
providing "glue" to hold the partnership together); Henderson, supra note 19, at 1703
(same).
62. Cf NELSON, supra note 17, at 49 (observing that highly prestigious firms
experienced slow growth during the time period studied); Heinz, Nelson & Laumann, supra
note 10, at 352 (theorizing that the slow-growth strategy appeals to firms with concern for
maintaining quality personnel and confidence in their ability to keep clients).
63. The slower growing partnerships have an average of 399 attorneys at 6.0 branch
offices; in contrast, the remaining 107 firms averaged 620 attorneys spread over 9.7 offices.
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profits per equity partner (PPP) ranging from $965,000 (the non-New York
City firm)64 to $2.6 million, which is significantly higher than the $906,000
average PPP for the remaining 107 firms; 65 and (d) they tend to have a much
higher ratio of associates to partners (2.59 on average) than their faster growing
66
counterparts (1.39 on average).
Firms that safely fall into the first group include Cravath, Swaine &
Moore,6 7 Wachtell Lipton,6 8 and Cahill, Gordon & Reindel.69 Yet, in regards
to the underlying tournament, over the last thirty years, even these slow-growth
firms have expanded their partnership at more than 50%. Assuming the firm
partners were managing the firm according to their own financial self-interest,
the expansion of the partnership was presumably part of a prudent strategy to
maintain the firm's lucrative client base and ensure the steady supply of highly
qualified associates.
At the fast growth part of the continuum, the second group (strong
reputation/high growth) includes high-prestige firms that have followed a
"megafirm" model. 70 For example, during the mid-1980s, Skadden Arps,
which currently has 1915 total lawyers and 541 partners at eighteen offices
throughout the world, made a strategic decision to diversify beyond its lucrative
domestic M&A practice and pursue an aggressive strategy of international
expansion. 7 1 Although many of these foreign offices failed to produce a profit
Calculation by authors from data provided by the Law Firms Working Group.
64. This firm contains a single office and is based in a city that is home to many high-
tech companies, according to data provided to the authors by the Law Firms Working Group.
65. Using an independent sample t-test, the PPP for the ten slowest-growing
partnerships was statistically different from the mean of the rest of the sample at p <0.000 (t-
statistic = 4.364).
66. Using an independent sample t-test, the ratio of associates to partners for the ten
slowest-growing partnerships was statistically different from the mean of the rest of the
sample at p <0.000 (t-statistic = 4.45 1).
67. See Deborah Graham, Branch Offices Crucial in Finn's Growth Strategies, LEGAL
TIMES, Sept. 21, 1981, at 29 (reporting how Cravath, Swaine & Moore is bucking the trend
of adding branch offices and partners). The article quotes the Cravath's David Owen
Brownwood, who states: "[We have] a different view as to the structure of the law firm and
the role of the partner.... [Our] ability to grow is limited by the number of people we can
effectively train." Id.
68. Thomas, Schwab & Hansen, supra note 10, at 144 (describing how Wachtell
Lipton has defied the authors' "megafirm" model through "its dominant market position as
the premier defense firm in the mergers and acquisitions business").
69. The Cahill Way, AM. LAW., July 2003, at 92 (reporting on Cahill Gordon &
Reindel's highly lucrative junk bond practice, how it has spumed growth in firm size and
partnership, and how it has achieved profitability on par with Wachtell Lipton and Cravath,
Swaine & Moore).
70. Thomas, Schwab & Hansen, supra note 10, at 142-43 (arguing that Skadden Arps
"reacted to client demand for more services by first expanding into more domestic practice
areas, and then internationally to open offices in other countries" and noting that "many
other rival large firms acted (or reacted) in the same way").
71. See LINCOLN CAPLAN, SKADDEN: POWER, MONEY, AND THE RISE OF A LEGAL
EMPIRE 282-86 (1993) (reporting a detailed account of the firm's decision to open offices in
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for several years-a fact decried by some of the Skadden partners who opposed
the plan yet were nonetheless subsidizing it-basic cost accounting inevitably
understated their value to the firm. As described by firm biographer Lincoln
Caplan, Skadden's international program "depend[ed] on the amount of work
generated for Skadden in the United States as a result of its foreign offices.
Skadden called this 'but-for business'-the firm would not have attracted it but
for one of its foreign offices."
72
Since the late 1970s, Skadden Arps partnership ranks have increased nearly
tenfold, often through heavy reliance on lateral hiring. 73 Moreover, its
profitability ($1.9 million PPP in 2005) is on par with its slow-growth
counterparts. According to Caplan's account, following the downturn of the
early 1990s, Skadden Arps continued to run a tournament competition for
partnership, though there was a widespread perception among firm associates
(and off-the-record acknowledgements by many partners) that the standards
had been ratcheted up over time. 74
Between the two extremes of high and low growth is a middle ground of
firms with lower initial endowments of reputational capital. Among this group,
we would expect the tournament to have the greatest effect on partnership
growth for the simple reason that a less lucrative partnership prize will
nonetheless be competitive with more elite firms if the odds of success are
higher (and thus of comparable expected value).75 Yet, setting aside the
heightened importance of tournament growth, which requires (i) steady
promotions (to recruit and retain associates) and (ii) yet more hiring to maintain
leverage, competition is a separate driver of growth for firms with lesser
amounts of reputational capital. The lower-reputation (i.e., lower-prestige)
firms will often track the geographic growth of their client base in an effort to
several key international cities). In a memo, managing partner Peter Mullin explained that,
"[t]his expansion makes sense if we are going to be a major international player, which I
strongly believe we should and must be." Id. at 286.
72. Id. at 295 (noting that the same work at Cleary Gottlieb was called "throwaway
work" because the process of identifying and quantifying its value was "so difficult that it
wasn't done").
73. See, e.g., Edward A. Adams, No 'Cold Calls,' NAT'L L.J., Dec. 11, 1989, at 2
("Skadden is thought to hire the largest number of lateral associates of any firm in the
nation."); Alison Frankel, Who's Going Global?, N.J. L.J., Nov. 6, 2000, at 33 ("Using its
own successful national expansion to Chicago and Los Angeles as its guide, Skadden plans
to continue to grow overseas... by hiring established lateral partners in cities where
Skadden's expertise in mergers and acquisitions and capital markets can be exploited.");
Michael Orey, Capitalizing on Structured Finance, AM. LAW., Apr. 1987, at 12 (noting that
Skadden Arps "built its structured-finance practice through aggressive lateral hiring").
74. CAPLAN, supra note 71, at 250-53 (reporting on tightening of partnership
promotions and perceptions among associates that "Skadden's [partnership] was far less
accessible to them than what the firm's leaders, and its recruiting videotape, had portrayed").
75. Stated mathematically, if an associate is risk neutral, a 10% chance of a $2 million
per year partnership is valued the same as a 40% chance of a $500,000 per year prize-both
have an expected value of $200,000 per year.
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dissuade clients from hiring rival firms.76 Thus, the need for geographic
coverage, often accomplished by merging with a smaller firm in a new market,
is a non-tournament factor that will affect the size of a law firm partnership.
Table 1. Top 20 Markets77 by Increase in NLJ 250 Offices, 1986 to
2006
Number of Offices Number of Lawyers
Market 1986 2006 Change [ 1986 2006 Change
New York City CSA
San Jose-San Francisco
CSA
Los Angeles CSA
Washington CSA
Philadelphia-Camden
CSA
London, England
Houston CSA
Brussels, Belgium
Chicago CSA
Atlanta CSA
San Diego CBSA
Beijing, China
Frankfurt, Germany
Tokyo, Japan
Boston CSA
Miami CBSA
Charlotte CBSA
Shanghai, China
Moscow, Russia
Dallas-Fort Worth CSA
106 226 120 10,938 23,773 12,835
2642
3788
5870
1954
195
1412
68
4297
999
283
4
22
25
1850
655
109
2
0
1638
6356
7049
15,035
3863
3877
2923
516
7540
3741
1344
213
660
519
4296
1923
981
194
351
2954
3714
3261
9165
1909
3682
1511
448
3243
2742
1061
209
638
494
2446
1268
872
192
351
1316
Table 1 lists the Top 20 markets in terms of new NLJ 250 offices over the
last two decades. Inspection of this data reveals several significant changes
over time. On the domestic front, the increase in the number of large firm
competitors has ranged from 27% in Washington, D.C. (171 to 218 offices)-
which, in 1986, was already the nation's most prominent branch office
76. See NELSON, supra note 17, at 8 (discussing opening branch offices to defend a
client base).
77. For locations in the United States, our definition of markets relies upon
metropolitan areas rather than municipal boundaries. Under the system adopted by the
Census Bureau in 2003, metropolitan areas are delineated by Core-Based Statistical Areas
(CBSA). Where more than one CBSA are adjacent to one another and commuting patterns
suggest interrelated labor markets, the CBSAs are bundled into a single Consolidated
Statistical Area (CSA). If the location fell within a CSA, it was coded accordingly;
otherwise, we used the CBSA code. Foreign offices were coded using a scheme we created.
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location-to 289% (9 to 35 offices) in San Diego. More significantly, by 2006,
the large law firm center of gravity shifted from Washington D.C. (218 offices)
to New York City (226). Although foreign expansion appears to be occurring at
a much faster rate, with a large number of new offices in key locations in
Europe and Asia, the absolute number of NLJ 250 lawyers working in specific
locations abroad is generally much lower than in large U.S. markets. The one
exception is London, which now employs 3877 lawyers working for NLJ 250
firms; London is now the sixth-largest market for all U.S.-based firms. Many of
these firms are now in head-to-head competition with the British Magic Circle
firms for lucrative international capital markets work.7 8
Expanding into a new geographic market is often an expensive, money-
losing proposition, at least for the first few years, 79 and lawyers at the firms'
larger and more established offices often perceive the new satellite operations
as dilutive of firm profits. 80 Thus, the need to get the office on solid financial
footing inevitably heightens competition within a local market not only for
clients but also for lawyers with portable books of business. Although national
law firms compete with other national law firms, the battle for partners is
stunningly local-between 2000 and 2005, 96.8% of all lateral movement
among the Am Law 200 occurred between offices in the same geographic
market. 8 1 Indeed, over the last two decades, the level of competition among
corporate law firms has ratcheted up dramatically. Finns may be getter larger,
but they are also getting more fragile.
78. See D. Daniel Sokol, Globalization of Law Firms: A Survey of the Literature and a
Research Agenda for Further Study, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 5, 11 (2007) ("U.K.
firms are under attack by U.S.-based competitors, particularly for high-end deal work that
requires medium rather than large resources.").
79. See, e.g., Heather Smith, Branch Office Basics, AM. LAW., Oct. 2003, at 57 ("New
offices and practices are expensive to establish, and if they don't become profitable, they can
be big drains [on firm resources]."); Sherry R. Sontag, Opening Offices Overseas: Does the
Payoff Warrant the Huge Expense?, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 12, 1990, at 1 ("[M]any firms opening
[overseas] offices can expect to lose money for more than five years. By contrast, new U.S.
branches are often profitable within two to three years.").
80. Thomas S. Clay, Branch Economics: The Decision to Open a New Office Should
Be Based on Hard Data, LEGAL TIMEs, Mar. 18, 2002, at 48 (reporting on how economic
performance of branch offices is a source of discord within large firms).
81. We calculated this figure using a file of lateral partners maintained by American
Lawyer Media. We coded branched offices using the U.S. Census Bureau FIPS codes for
each metropolitan area. An electronic newsletter published weekly by Hildebrandt
International, Inc. corroborates the relationship between new branch offices and heightened
local competition. See HILDEBRANDT HEADLINES, supra note 41 (reporting 249 examples of
lateral movement involving two or more lawyers with an average of 7.5 lawyers per
movement between January 2005 and July 2007).
1890 [Vol. 60:1867
THE ELASTIC TOURNAMENT
B. Tier Structure and the Tournament
In a competitive marketplace in which rainmaking partners have abundant
opportunities at crosstown rivals, expanding the partnership runs the risk of
diluting profits and prompting the exit of key lawyers. In turn, large-scale
defections can threaten the survival of the firms. 82 To examine how these
heightened competitive pressures affect the promotion-to-partnership
tournament, we calculated the proportion of NLJ 250 firms with a partnership
that shrank from the prior year. Because the promotion of partners to a non-
equity tier has less economic consequences for rainmaking partners, and thus
may mitigate the pressure to shrink the partnership, we also calculated the
proportion of NLJ 250 partners who were categorized as non-equity. The
results for 1984 to 2006 are summarized in Figure 7.83
Figure 7. Percentage of NLJ 250 Partnership that Shrank from Prior
Year, Percentage of NLJ 250 Partners Who Are Non-Equity
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Between 1993 and 2007, the number of NLJ 250 firms reporting at least
one non-equity partner increased from 42.4% to 74.8%.84 More tellingly, for
82. See, e.g., WILLIAM G. JOHNSTON, INTERNATIONAL, INC., ANATOMY OF LAW FIRM
FAILURES 14-16 & ex. A (2004) (concluding that partner defections were catalysts in
numerous large firm dissolutions between 1998 and 2004).
83. We begin the analysis with fiscal year 1984 because from that year forward, at
least 231 firms in any year also appeared on the NLJ 250 for the prior year. Prior to 1984,
the largest number of repeat NLJ 250 firms was 194. In 1994, the NLJ began collecting data
on non-equity partners.
84. Note that this figure probably understates the true magnitude of the shift to non-
equity partnerships. Since 1994, approximately two dozen NLJ 250 firms have declined to
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fiscal year 2005, the number of equity partners in the Am Law 200 was 26,903,
a gain of only 148 from the prior year (26,755). In contrast, for the same time
period, the number of non-equity partners increased from 10,780 to 12,235-a
13.5% jump.
In many fundamental respects, during the last two decades, the implicit
contract underwriting the promotion-to-partnership tournament has been
rewritten by law firms attempting to retain their most valuable assets-the
human capital of partners and associates. In essence, the prize of equity
partnership, which includes the traditional prerogatives of ownership, is
increasingly rare. In a recent qualitative empirical study, which interviewed
lawyers at ten NLJ 250 law firms, Kimberly Kirkland observed that the
threshold question in promotion to equity partner is not necessarily whether the
lawyer "finds" or "binds" clients to the firm, but whether failure to promote
will cause the person to leave the firm with clients in tow.85 Further, even if
partnership is attained, the prevalence of large scale de-equitizations8 6 has
eroded the expectation that the equity prize includes "lifetime tenure with the
firm."8 7
In this more competitive landscape, it is the partners rather than associates
who bear the brunt of the changes. According to longitudinal data collected by
the Altman Weil consulting firm, between 1985 and 2003, the average billable
hours for associates has consistently hovered at the 1850 level. Yet, during this
same period, the billable hours for partners in their 25th to 29th year after law
school graduation has steadily climbed from 1538 to levels consistently over
1700.88 Perhaps the simplest explanation for these trends is the specter of de-
equitization, which causes partners to work harder. Conversely, the plight of
provide a breakdown between equity and non-equity partners. We suspect this is because it
would reveal significant changes in the firm's internal structure toward a larger non-equity
tier. See also Henderson, supra note 19, at 1695 (documenting rapid movement toward two-
tier partnerships).
85. See Kimberly Kirkland, Ethics in Large Law Firms: The Principle of Pragmatism,
35 U. MEM. L. REv. 631, 694 & n.227 (2005) (quoting law firm equity partner who said that
"the first question" that is asked in the partnership decision is whether the lawyer would
leave if not made an equity partner).
86. See ROBERT W. HILLMAN, HILLMAN ON LAWYER MOBILITY: THE LAW AND ETHics
OF PARTNER WITHDRAWALS AND LAW FIRM BREAKUPS § 1.2 (1998 & 2004 supp.); see also
REGAN, supra note 7, at 47 (discussing how de-equitizations at Milbank Tweed in 1987
reflected a sea change in the firm's culture); Lynne Marek, Jenner and Block Takes Some
Partners off Equity Level, NAT'L L.J., June 11, 2007, at 10 (reporting that between fifteen
and twenty Jenner & Block attorneys would be moved to the non-equity tiers and that
Chicago-based competitor Mayer Brown recently de-equitized forty-five partners); Gina
Passarella, De-Equitization Persists Despite Better Economic Times for Firms, RECORDER,
Oct. 11, 2006, at 2 (reporting on persistence of de-equizations despite strong economy and
law firm growth).
87. REGAN, supra note 7, at 25 (discussing benefits of Wall Street law partnerships
during the 1950s and 1960s).
88. See Henderson, supra note 19, at 1710 (citing 2004 Altman Weil Survey of Law
Firm Economics).
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partners could be having an effect on associates-why bill more hours when
the payoff of partnership is increasingly less attractive? 89
Despite this fundamental shift in what it means to be partner in a major
corporate law firm, there is contemporary empirical evidence that promotion-
to-partnership tournament remains an apt metaphor for describing how large
firms recruit and retain high-quality associates. Drawing upon a dataset of
midlevel associates at Am Law 200 firms, which included detailed information
on associates' working conditions and firms' financial performance, a recent
empirical study (conducted by one of the authors) used multivariate regression
analysis to explore several factors that are likely to affect associate attrition.90
The results display a relatively intuitive and unambiguous set of tradeoffs. A
higher likelihood of staying with the firms for two years or longer was
associated (at statistically significant levels) with: (a) more interesting work;
(b) higher "quality" work, presumably because it enhances an associate's
human capital; (c) shorter work weeks; (d) a more family-friendly workplace;
(e) a higher ratio of non-equity to equity partners, presumably because it
increased the odds of "making partner"; and (f) greater communication
regarding partnership prospects.9 1 After controlling for all of these factors,
combined salary and bonus had no statistical relationship to midlevel
associate's desire to remain with the firm. Rather, the economic carrots appear
to be partnership, substantively interesting work (which is associated with
lower firm profits!), or enhancing one's options elsewhere through assignment
to higher quality work.92
C. Partner Mobility
According to Leslie Corwin, the author of the leading treatise on law firm
partnership agreements, 93 we are now in "the age of attorney mobility."94 This
89. Indeed, at $160,000 per year, a slacking associate can pay off his or her entire legal
education before firm management broaches the issue of underperformance. See, e.g.,
KERMIT ROOSEVELT, IN THE SHADOW OF THE LAW (2005) (suggesting that large paychecks
entice many young lawyers to take large firm jobs with the clear intention of shirking and
leaving).
90. See Henderson & Zaring, supra note 58, at 1102 & tbl.5.
91. Id.; see also Amy Kolz, Can You Hear Me Now?, AM. LAW., Oct. 2005, at 107
(reporting results of annual survey of third, fourth, and fifth year associates and noting that
"[a]mong the 12 categories we use to determine our rankings, communicating what it takes
to make partner had the lowest average score (2.93 on a scale of 5)").
92. See Henderson & Zaring, supra note 58, at 1100-01 & tbl.4 (discussing results of a
multivariate analysis of law firm profitability that used the same Am Law midlevel associate
data).
93. LESLIE D. CORWIN & ARTHUR J. CIAMpI, LAW FIRM PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS
(1998).
94. Leslie D. Corwin, Response to Loyalty in the Firm: A Statement of General
Principles on the Duties of Partners Withdrawing from Law Firms, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1055, 1056 (1998).
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new environment, which is widely blamed for many professional ills,95 is a
product of two distinct but interrelated factors: (1) a surge in demand for
specialized corporate legal services; and (2) an increased transparency as to the
value of those services, both through advanced information systems for firm
management clients and the aggregation of detailed financial information
through the legal press and law firm consultants.9 6 Like all markets, the
infusion of new and better information inevitably advantages the buyer, thus
driving down price to the marginal cost of production. In short, a substantial
portion of corporate legal services-but not all-is in the process of being
commoditized. After sketching out some of the key milestones in the
maturation of the lateral partner market, we present empirical evidence that
suggests the emergence of a separating dynamic that hinges on a firm's relative
mix of practice specialties.
The age of lawyer mobility is the antithesis of the so-called "Golden Era"
of big law firms (circa 1960). During the "Golden Era," the prosperity of major
firms was primarily the result of close and longstanding ties with major
corporate clients.97 With high profit margins and negligible international
competition, corporations had little incentive to forgo the benefits of an
established relationship with an outside law firm in search of comparable
services at a lower price. As U.S. corporations grew in size and geographic
reach, and regulatory compliance and civil litigation became large and
perennial expenses, company lawyers were given greater latitude to scrutinize
the fees of outside counsel and, if cost justified, to hire additional lawyers to
perform the work in-house.98 With the growing prominence of corporate
general counsel, who had company mandates to control costs and the
sophistication to assess and prioritize the company's legal needs, hiring outside
counsel was increasingly limited to matters requiring expertise.9 9 Moreover,
95. See, e.g., ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER 277 (1993).
96. Access to key benchmarking information is not limited to The American Lawyer
and the National Law Journal. For example, the Law Firm Group at Citibank, which often
has negotiated access to law firm information systems, conducts a detailed annual
benchmarking process for law firms. In the most recent survey, over 90% of Am Law 100
firms participated. See Citi Private Bank: The Law Firm Group,
http://www.citibank.com/privatebank/lawfirms_9.htm.
97. See GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 14, at 33-34.
98. SOL M. LINowITz, THE BETRAYED PROFESSION: LAWYERING AT THE END OF THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY 186-87 (1994) (discussing how higher legal costs cause many large
corporations to build rather than buy necessary legal inputs, thus leading to many large firms
"sprout[ing] within the Fortune 500 companies"); Heinz, Nelson & Laumann, supra note 10,
at 347-48 (discussing how bureaucratization of the in-house lawyer role reduced the role of
outside law over corporate decision making).
99. See GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 14, at 50 ("In their relationship with outside
law firms, today's enlarged corporate legal departments impose budgetary restraints, exert
more control over cases, demand periodic reports, and engage in comparison shopping
among firms."); Mark C. Suchman, Working Without a Net: The Sociology of Legal Ethics in
Corporate Litigation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 837, 856 (1998) (reporting large in-house
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when looking for this expertise, the search became more focused on the best
lawyer rather than the best firm. 1
00
During the 1970s, one of the most sought-after specialties was merger and
acquisition counseling for corporations seeking to acquire (or fend off) another
company in a hostile takeover bid. Remarkably, the established Wall Street
firms were reluctant to either take the work, or, alternatively, resort to the
highly aggressive tactics that could achieve their clients' objective-typically
the acquisition of a grossly undervalued company (often due to complacent
management) or the retention of corporate control in ways that pitted corporate
officers against the majority of shareholders. 10 1 As a result, this work flowed to
several upstart firms such as Wachtell Lipton and Skadden Arps, which were
comprised largely of Jewish lawyers who were shunned by "white shoes"
despite their strong Ivy League credentials. 102 Eventually, Wall Street firms
that retained Skadden or Wachtell on behalf of longtime clients noticed the fees
piling up and began in earnest to acquire these specialties themselves, thus
expediting the erosion of longstanding firm-client relationships.'0 3 By 1976,
when the takeover era entered full swing, New York magazine quoted "one top
lawyer" as saying, "Joe [Flom has] done the most magnificent thing anyone's
ever done in the law business. He's broken the link between the old investment
banking firms and blue-chip companies and their Wall Street lawyers."'
0 4
In 1977, the Supreme Court ruled in Bates v. State of Arizona 10 5 that the
traditional state bar restrictions on lawyer advertising were in violation of the
First Amendment. Almost immediately, lawyers became more willing to
discuss their cases and opinions with the press. 10 6 The following year, The
American Lawyer and the National Law Journal launched publication and
ushered in a completely new era of legal journalism that chronicled the
business of law, including lawyer incomes, firm strategy, and other market
departments have turned corporations into "unprecedentedly informed consumers of
professional services").
100. REGAN, supra note 7, at 33 (noting that companies are now "more concerned with
retaining individual lawyers than specific firms"); Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 16, at 385
("The catchphrase now is: 'Shop for a lawyer, not a law firm."').
101. See CAPLAN, supra note 71, at 63-73 (discussing rise of mergers-and acquisitions-
practice and reluctance of established Wall Street firms to get involved, even when clients
were under siege by corporate raiders).
102. On the demise of the barriers against Jewish lawyers in the world of large New
York firms, see Eli Wald, The Rise and Fall of the WASP and Jewish Law Firms, 60 STAN.
L. REv. 1803 (2008).
103. CAPLAN, supra note 71, at 71.
104. Id.
105. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
106. See GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 14, at 71 ("Bates liberated lawyers to talk to
the press about their practices, for they no longer feared being accused of advertising.");
LINOWITZ, supra note 98, 31-33 (former general counsel for Xerox Corporation blaming
Bates for the erosion of professional values and the excessive focus on law firm finances).
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trends. 107 The first issue of The American Lawyer set the tone by focusing on a
taboo topic that was rarely discussed in public: how much money lawyers
made. 108 The headline for the feature story read, "Flom Firm Takes over as Top
Money Maker in '78,''109 which reinforced the perception that a strong mergers
and acquisitions practice was key to a firm's financial performance.
During this same time period, the National Law Journal began its perennial
practice of listing the 250 largest firms by the number of lawyers. By the mid-
1980s, The American Lawyer began its annual ranking of law firms by total
revenues, which also included a breakdown by profits per partner. 10 Based on
our review of American Lawyer data provided to the Law Firms Working
Group, it appears that within a few short years, lawyers gained the ability to
evaluate the adequacy of their own pay by comparing it to crosstown rivals.
Simultaneously, because of the ascendancy of the in-house general counsel
(now commonly referred to as "chief legal officers"),"1 ' who now assumed a
much greater role in controlling costs and achieving desirable legal outcomes
for the cost, clients' loyalties were much more likely to run to specific lawyers
than specific law firms. Thus, the combination of the shifting client loyalties
and better financial information made it possible for many partners to garner
the market rate for their services by switching (or threatening to switch)
firms. 112 For example, at Skadden Arps, which was highly profitable and
anxious to expand, the annual publication of its financials by The American
Lawyer was viewed as an effective way to attract lateral partners to the firm. 113
107. See Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift: Why Discarding
Professional Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1229, 1254 & n.133 (1995) (reporting on emergence of these publications and sources
about their origins).
108. CAPLAN, supra note 71, at 80.
109. Id.
110. This list began in 1985 as the Am Law 50. It was expanded to the Am Law 75 in
1986, the Am Law 100 in 1987, and the Am Law 200 in 1999.
111. This systemic change between 1975 and 1995 is observed in the Chicago
Lawyers II study. See HEINZ ET AL., supra note 2, at 297-99 ("A key factor in weakening the
ties between law firms and their clients was the changing role of corporate inside counsel
[who by 1995 increasingly came to] mediate the relationships between outside lawyers and
corporate management, monitor and evaluate the performance of outside lawyers, review
billings from law firms, and exercise judgment about whether . . . charges [were]
excessive."); see also LINOWITZ, supra note 98, at 82-83 (asserting that proliferation of legal
issues during the post-World War II era meant "no single outside lawyer" could answer
executives' legal questions and the perceived answer was in-house general counsel as a
mediator between management and outside lawyers).
112. See HILLMAN, LAWYER MOBILITY, supra note 866, § 1.1 & n.12 (supp. 2007)
("[I]ncreased mobility has permitted lawyers with the ability to transport clients and
revenues to demand a larger share of firm income.").
113. See CAPLAN, supra note 71, at 99 (reporting on the firm's shrewd use of legal
press). Further, profiles of successful lawyers at other firms were often used as a means of
identifying lateral candidates "for acquisition." Id. (quoting firm managing partner); see also
PAUL HOFFMAN, LIONS OF THE EIGHTIES: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE POWERHOUSE LAW FIRMS
340 (1982) (noting the rise of the legal press in work by author who wrote two journalistic
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As Skadden opened new branch offices, it routinely poached partners from
each city's leading law firms.
114
With the increased sophistication and bureaucratization of corporate legal
departments, general counsel became less reliant on law firm referral networks
to find capable lawyers in other cities. Thus, increasingly, large corporate law
firms based in different U.S. cities became competitors for national work. As a
result, the opening of branch offices became an important means of defending a
firm's (or powerful partner's) client base. Staffing these new offices has surely
accelerated the pace of lateral mobility.
115
Similarly, the advent of the computer and sophisticated software has
profoundly influenced the behavior of the market participants. Increasingly, the
financial performance of a firm is tracked internally on an office-by-office,
practice-group-by-practice group, lawyer-by-lawyer level.1 16 Under the widely
acclaimed Du Pont Legal Model1 17 for managing a corporation's outside law
firms, general counsels are demanding that law firms utilize specific
proprietary software so that it can control and share information and work
product among other outside firms.1 1 8 With the interconnectivity of business
over the Internet, a large proportion of clients are demanding that law firms
submit their bills electronically using a standardized format that facilitates firm-
to-firm comparisons on similar matters. 1 19 Thus, from virtually every
accounts of elite law firms in the early 1970s and 1980s); Bruce E. Aronson, Elite Law Firm
Mergers and Reputational Competition: Is Bigger Really Better? An International
Comparison, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 763, 770 n. 11 (2007) ("Changes in the law firms'
operating environment and the firms' responses to such changes can be conveniently tracked
by the growth and expansion of the legal press. In the early 1980s, the legal press began to
provide extensive coverage on what had generally been private matters within firms."); Marc
Galanter, The Legal Malaise; Or, Justice Observed, 19 LAW Soc'Y REv. 537, 547 (1985)
(discussing advent of "National Law Journal, The American Lawyer, [and] Legal Times"
during the late 1970s that provided details of law firms developments and finances that "all
but a few insiders or dedicated students could have known a few years back.").
114. See CAPLAN, supra note 71, at 99-100.
115. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
116. See Susan Saab Fortney, Soul for Sale: An Empirical Study of Associate
Satisfaction, Law Firm Culture, and the Effects of Billable Hour Requirements, 69 UMKC L.
REv. 239, 247 & n.40 (2000) (discussing the emergence of new software that tracks billable
hours, collection rates, and profitability of specific matters); Bruce A. Green, Professional
Challenges in Large Firm Practices, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 7, 21-22 (2005) (citing
comments of law firm partner during conference proceedings).
117. The Du Pont Legal Model is a specific set of guidelines to assist large corporate
legal departments in the management of outside counsel. See Du Pont Legal Model,
http://www.dupontlegalmodel.com/competitiveedge.asp (follow "Information Technology-
The EDGE" hyperlink) ("The heart of strategic partnering [with outside law firms] at
DuPont is knowledge transfer and communication.").
118. See Milton C. Regan, Jr., Law Firms, Competition Penalties, and the Values of
Professionalism, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 1, 53 & nn.277, 282 (discussing features and
influence of Du Pont Model, including adoption of technology to facilitate information
sharing).
119. See James Evangelista, Teresa Stange & Kelley Johnston, Electronic Billing
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perspective, the economic contribution of specific lawyers or law firms has
become more measurable and transparent.
Under the emerging elastic tournament model, entry into the inner core of
equity partnership requires that a lawyer possess an excess of human capital
that can be profitably exploited by the firm. If that human capital is more
valuable at a crosstown rival-for example, there is a different mix of practice
groups that creates more opportunity for cross-selling, or the firm has more
reputational capital, which permits the lawyer to charge higher fees-then the
lawyer may switch firms. Alternatively, an equity partner can be forced out of
the inner core (de-equitized) if he or she loses an important client or a change
in the law wipes out his or her practice specialty. 120 Indeed, firms are likely to
take these steps preventively in order avoid the dilution of profits and the
defection of equity partners with much larger books of business. 121 Growing
disparities in billing rates due to evolving market rates for specific practice
specialties can also create tensions within the inner core, causing some equity
partners with large books of business in less lucrative practice areas to depart
for smaller or less elite firms. 12 2 Although law firm culture may mitigate these
economic tensions, its influence inevitably becomes weaker as law firm
partnerships become larger and more geographically dispersed.1
23
Offers Advantages, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 26, 2005, at S1 (reporting on wide adoption of this
technology by Fortune 100 companies and the use of electronic invoices by the vast majority
of the top 200 U.S. law firms); Rob Thomas, Managing Outside Counsel: New Survey
Reveals Clients Are Imposing More Constraints on Their Law Firms, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 17,
2003, at 22 ("An increasing number of in-house counsel are ... requiring electronic billing,
which gives them direct access to financial data for each matter and [enables] ... automated
systems to audit bills and compare actual spending with budgets.").
120. Kirkland, supra note 85, at 675 (reporting on pressures faced by lawyers who lose
important clients and observing that lawyer's standing in firm is contingent on his
relationship with his clients).
121. See Henderson, supra note 19, at 1743 (noting that primary benefit of two-tier
partnership is not necessarily higher profits but heightened stability through a structure that
privileges rainmakers).
122. Kirkland, supra note 85, at 675 ("This partner must either find new clients or
resign and take his existing clients to a firm that charges lower rates [when rates exceed what
clients will pay].").
123. See HEINZ ET AL., supra note 2, at 304 (observing that norms of cooperation and
collegiality require a small number of ties and that law firm growth makes it unlikely that
these norms will survive); REGAN, supra note 7, at 39 (noting that "sheer size" of modem
law firms makes consensus impractical); Suchman, supra note 99, at 857 ("As law firms
grow and diversify, informal social structures and face-to-face contacts no longer suffice to
bind these organizations together, and a new regime of formal hierarchy, record-keeping,
and evaluation has slowly begun to emerge."); see also Paul C. Saunders, When
Compensation Creates Culture, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 295, 296-97 (2006) (partner from
Cravath, Swaine & Moore, which has a relatively small partnership that relies upon lockstep
compensation, opining that the eat-what-you-kill system undermines "collegiality and
partnership" and may even create an unethical culture).
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D. The Emerging Equilibrium
If the market for corporate legal services is in the process of becoming
more atomized, with fewer barriers to competition imposed by geography,
client loyalties, information asymmetry, or norms of collegiality, it is worth
considering the likely contours of the emerging equilibrium. Fortunately, to
explore this issue, we have been given access to a unique dataset of lateral
partner movement maintained by ALM, Inc. 1
24
The sample, which was built primarily from news releases at each lawyer's
new firm, includes 14,338 lawyer movements from January 2000 through
December 2005. In general, lateral movement appeared to be ramping up
during this six-year period, starting with the lowest volume (1998 movements)
in 2000 and ending with highest (2752) in 2005. The majority of lawyers (the
overwhelming majority of whom were partners, members, shareholders, or held
another title denoting ownership status) were joining an Am Law 200 law firm.
The total volume breaks down as follows:
" Moving to Large Law Firm: 50.2% were leaving a firm (occasionally
through acquisition or merger) or a position as an in-house or
government lawyer to join an Am Law 200 firm;
* Intra-Am Law 200: 28.3% were moving within the Am Law 200;
* Moving from Large to Small or Medium-sized Firms: 18.4% were
exiting the Am Law 200 for smaller firms;
* Movement Between Small and Medium-sized Firms: 3.1% were
leaving jobs with government, business, or a small or medium-sized
firm for a firm that was not in the Am Law 200.
If a law firm that was left or joined was in the Am Law 200 during the year
that the lateral movement occurred, we were able to match it with
corresponding financial and demographic data, such as firm size and profits per
partner. In total, 4056 records had profitability data for both the firm left and
firm joined.
Most cases also included office left and office joined. To ensure that
locations track regional labor markets, we recoded each office location based
on the Census Bureau FIPS codes for metropolitan area. 125 Fifty-five-point six
percent of the total movement was in the five largest U.S. legal markets: New
York City CSA (2264), Washington D.C. CSA (2017), Chicago CSA (947),
San Francisco CSA (870), and Los Angeles CSA (684). Foreign locations
(10.1%) and the remainder of the U.S. (34.3%) comprised the balance. As
noted earlier, 126 96.8% of all lateral movement is within the same regional
labor market.
124. ALM, Inc., is a media conglomerate that publishes The American Lawyer, the
National Law Journal, and several regional and topical publications on the legal profession.
125. For an explanation of metropolitan area coding, see supra note 77.
126. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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Finally, most of the observations included the name of the law firm
practice group joined, which we sorted into twelve discrete practice areas plus
an "other" category for highly specialized niches. Building upon the common
perception that corporations now shop for lawyers rather than law firms, we
theorized about the possibility of a separating dynamic, in which lawyers in
lucrative, marquee practices that bind the client to a firm, tend to move up to
more profitable firms. Conversely, all else equal, other less-favored practice
areas tend to move to less prestigious or profitable firms. 27 Over time, firms
with a less lucrative mix of practice specialties may be less able to characterize
themselves as large general service law firms, or at a minimum, keep pace with
the top of the market in the associate salary wars.
Table 2 presents a breakdown of practice specialties for the 5096 lawyers
who moved between Am Law 200 law firms during the observation period. The
table is ordered by the difference in profits per partner (PPP) between the firm
joined and the firm left. For the sample as a whole, there is a movement toward
more profitable firms (from $742,563 to $759,257). Yet, when the data are
disaggregated, both the magnitude of the gain (or loss) and the relative starting
position of the firm left appear to be strongly influenced by practice setting.
Consistent with our hypothesis, lateral lawyers with capital market or M&A
experience tend to lateral to more lucrative firms. Similarly, in periods of
heightened perceptions of corporate wrongdoing, partners specializing in white
collar crime or securities enforcement litigation (i.e., involving investigation by
the SEC) appear to have been in high demand. Conversely, lawyers in real
estate, regulatory practice, and trusts & estates were, on average, moving from
firms of above average profitability to those that were below average.
127. We theorized that some practice specialties, particularly those involving the
capital markets, tend to be more remunerative and place those lawyers in direct contact with
high-level corporate executives. Therefore, they commanded a price premium in the lateral
market. Conversely, some practice specialties, such as labor and employment, may be more
susceptible to price pressure from in-house counsel, which could generate tensions with
partners in firm's marquee practices. See Kirkland, supra note 85, at 672-75 (discussing how
tensions arise between practice groups over conflict checks and differing fee structures).
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Table 2. Mean Profits per Partner of Lawyer Partners, by Practice
Specialty, 2000 to 2005
Firm % of
Practice Area Firm Left Joined Difference N Total
White Collar &
Securities Enforc.* $721,837 $1,009,490 $287,653 49 1.2%
M&A, Cap. Mkts.,
Emerging Bus.* $804,980 $919,644 $114,664 253 6.2%
Intellectual Property* $693,272 $781,620 $88,348 460 11.3%
Antitrust $857,089 $944,114 $87,025 79 1.9%
Labor & Employment $610,426 $665,019 $54,593 270 6.7%
Bankruptcy $717,895 $734,386 $16,491 114 2.8%
Corporate Securities $750,831 $766,159 $15,328 686 16.9%
Litigation $735,033 $738,620 $3,587 598 14.7%
Other $733,510 $736,464 $2,953 386 9.5%
Business Law $836,592 $801,757 -$34,835 515 12.7%
Regulatory* $700,583 $657,222 -$43,361 360 8.9%
Real Estate, Public &
Project Finance* $764,480 $708,100 -$56,380 250 6.2%
Trusts & Estates* $766,806 $608,889 -$157,917 36 0.9%
* Statistically Different from Group Mean at p < .01
To draw a sharper picture of these dynamics, we specified a linear
regression in which the dependent variable was the natural log of the profits per
partner of the firm joined (PPPoined). Because relative starting position
presumably affects a partner's incentive to pursue a lateral offer (or a decision
to de-equitize), we included the natural log of PPPeaf. 128 To assess the effect of
specific practice specialties, we included indicator variables for each practice
group, with the exception of litigation, general business, and "other." We
deleted these three categories from our specification on the theory that virtually
every law firm maintains practitioners in these areas; thus, they would make an
appropriate reference group. Finally, to control for the effect of regional labor
markets, we included dummy variables for the five largest U.S. legal markets.
The regression results, which are set forth in Table 3, are consistent with
our initial hypothesis. Marquee specialties such as M&A, private equity, white
collar crime/securities enforcement, antitrust, and intellectual property are all
associated with a substantial premium for lateral movement. In contrast, labor
& employment, real estate/public & project finance, trust and estates, and
regulatory work are all associated with a price discount. Only bankruptcy had
no statistical relationship with profits at the firm being joined.
128. We used the natural log transformation for both PPPIeft and PPPjoined to eliminate
estimation error associated with nonrandom distribution of errors (i.e., heteroskedacity).
129. There is also significant regional variation. Compared with the rest of the sample,
lateral movement was associated with large gains in New York, Los Angeles, and San
Francisco, and a more modest gain in Washington, D.C. In contrast, in Chicago, there was
no price premium associated with lateral movement. This may be the result of the prevalence
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Table 3. OLS of Natural Log PPP (firm joined)
Variable B Std. Error P-value
(Constant) -106.968 8.356 0.000
LNLeft 0.256 0.015 0.000
Fiscal Year 0.058 0.004 0.000
Joined DC Firm 0.047 0.017 0.005
Joined NYC Firm 0.138 0.016 0.000
Joined Chicago Firm -0.016 0.023 0.484
Joined San Francisco Firm 0.191 0.023 0.000
Joined LA Firm 0.132 0.024 0.000
Regulatory -0.113 0.022 0.000
Antitrust 0.131 0.042 0.002
M&A, Private Equity, Venture Capital 0.166 0.026 0.000
Intellectual Property 0.053 0.019 0.005
Labor & Employment -0.083 0.024 0.001
Real Estate, Public & Project Finance -0.071 0.025 0.004
White Collar & Securities Enforcement 0.267 0.051 0.000
Trusts & Estates -0.153 0.064 0.017
Corporate Securities 0.026 0.017 0.139
Bankruptcy -0.014 0.035 0.701
N 3553
ADJUSTED R2  26.6%
Finally, to get a picture of the broader corporate law marketplace, which
includes movement both in and out of the Am Law 200, we also calculated the
proportion of lateral movement by practice area that was (a) to a more
profitable firm within the Am Law 200, or (b) from a smaller firm to one in the
Am Law 200.130 These data, which are summarized in Table 4, further
corroborate a separation in which lateral lawyers in certain practice specialties
are more (or less) likely to join a larger and typically more profitable firm.
Similar to our regression results on movement within the Am Law 200, a
disproportionate number of laterals who work in M&A, private equity, white
collar and securities enforcement litigation, corporate securities, and
intellectual property appear to be in demand as evidenced by their
disproportionate upward movement. Conversely, lawyers more likely to move
downstream include those working in regulatory practices, trusts and estates, or
other niche specialties. Presumably, this pattern is a function of greater price
of two-tier firms in the Chicago market, see Cindy Collins, Anchoring Associates, OF
COUNSEL, Nov. 2, 1998, at 17 (referring to Chicago as the "land of two-tier partnerships"
because of its early adoption by many of the city's leading firms), and/or a disproportionate
number of de-equitizations, which has prompted substantial downstream movement.
130. Note that the sample includes some small firm lawyers who joined a larger firm
as the result of a merger or acquisition.
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sensitivity in these practices areas and/or fewer opportunities to originate
additional business for the firm.
Table 4. Lateral Movement, Upstream or Downstream, by Practice
Area
Practice Areas Downstream Upstream % Upstream
White Collar and Securities
Enforcement Lit.* 40 145 78.4%
M&A, Capital Markets, Emerging
Businesses* 177 620 77.8%
Intellectual Property* 342 1031 75.1%
Corporate Securities* 599 1544 72.0%
Litigation* 68 171 71.5%
Antitrust 756 1740 69.7%
Real Estate, Public & Project Finance 298 660 68.9%
Business Law 503 1065 67.9%
Labor & Employment 234 485 67.5%
Bankruptcy 413 768 65.0%
Regulatory* 101 183 64.4%
Trusts & Estates* 68 95 58.3%
Other* 843 948 52.9%
All Practice Groups 4442 9455 68.0%
* Statistically Different from Group Mean at p < 0.01
For decades, virtually all large law firms have operated under some variant
of the "Cravath system," in which the entry level ranks were filled by the best
available (and acceptable) graduates from the best schools. 13 1 The upshot of
this practice is a remarkable uniformity of starting salaries across major
markets. 132 Yet, the reshuffling of lateral lawyers by practice area
concentrations suggests the likelihood that the market for entry level talent will
eventually divide into elite and semi-elite sectors. Specifically, as the demand
for corporate law firm associates continues to escalate, the most profitable
firms are in the best position to recruit a more lucrative mix of practice areas
through the lateral market. In turn, the surplus of high-margin work enables
these same firms to compete more effectively in the associate salary wars. This
dynamic is consistent with profitability data from the Am Law 200, which
reveals large and growing disparities among large firms. Since 1998 (the first
131. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
132. See, e.g., Press Release, Nat'l Ass'n for Law Placement (NALP), Salaries at
Largest Firms Continue to Rise Rapidly, (Sept. 14, 2007), available at
http://www.nalp.org/press/details.php?id=71 ("The prevailing salary in the largest firms rose
to $145,000 in a number of cities: Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, the San Francisco Bay and
Silicon Valley areas, and Washington, DC. In New York, the prevailing salary was even
higher, $160,000.").
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fiscal year for the Am Law 200), the average profits per equity partner among
the most profitable quartile of firms (ranked 1-50) has increased 95.3%, from
$926,571 to $1,809,935; during the same time, profitability in the bottom
quartile has increase only 58.3%, from $287,909 to $455,780.133 Figure 8
compares average associate starting salaries with average PPP by quartile for
the 2006 Am Law 200. Although associate pay is remarkably uniform across
the 200 firms, there are dramatic differences in profits per partner. Indeed, the
ratio of PPP to starting salary varies from 4.0 at the 25th percentile to 13.9 at
the 95th percentile.
Figure 8. Average Associate Starting Salary
& Profits per Partner Am Law 200 (FY 2005)
$2,250,000
$2,000,000 - I Average Associate Starting Salary (13.9)
U Average Profits per Partner
$1,750,000
$1,500,000
(Ratio of starting salary to PPP)
$1,250,000 (7.7)
$1,000,000
$750,000 
(5.3)
$500,000
$250,000
$0
25th Percentile 50th Percentile 75th Percentile 95th Percentile
There is ample evidence that large law firms at the middle and lower end of
the profitability spectrum are rethinking their business models in order to blunt
or escape the effects of the salary wars. For example, Howrey LLP, a 630-
lawyer firm that focuses primarily on litigation, recently announced that it is
matching the $160,000 market rate for starting salaries but thereafter scuttling
lockstep compensation for associates in favor of a "merit-based" system.
134
Dechert LLP, a 700-lawyer firm in Philadelphia, introduced a separate pay
133. Weighted average based on the number of equity partners per firm.
134. See Zusha Elinson, Howrey to Ditch Lockstep Compensation for Merit-Based
Model, RECORDER, June 29, 2007, http://www.law.com/jsp/llf/PubArticleLLF.
jsp?id=l 183107981391.
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scale for associates in its prestigious financial services groups, creating a pay
differential of $30,000 per year by the eighth year.'13 McDermott, Will &
Emery, a 1000-lawyer firm based in Chicago, recently created a second tier of
attorneys that will have "good pedigrees" but will work less, be paid less, bill
out at a lower rate, and not be on track for partnership. 136 Thelen Reid, a 600-
lawyer firm headquartered in Northern California, implemented a different two-
tier model that permits associates to opt-in to the higher market rate in
exchange for a 2000-hour billable hour requirement. 137 Chapman & Cutler, a
220-lawyer firm in Chicago, matched the recent $160,000 market rate for entry
levels, but after the second year, permits associates to opt-in to a lower pay
scale with fewer hours. 13 8 Finally, as we write this article, there is grumbling
among many large firm associates that they are getting "lowball" bonuses this
year,139 breaking the longstanding practice of matching the market leader. 140
In the years to come, we predict that the law firms with a strong presence
in the capital markets area will further raise the stakes in the salary wars and
permanently separate themselves from their semi-elite counterparts. As this
price differential creates two or more strata of corporate law firms, with
different pay scales and a perceived drop-off in elite credentials,14 1 the
watering down of the Cravath system may open the door to new and innovative
135. See Posting of David Lat to Above the Law, Skaddenfreude: Dechert DC's FSG
Favoritism?, http://www.abovethelaw.com/2007/02/skaddenfreude-dechert-dcs-fsg.php
(Feb. 12, 2007, 22:21 EST).
136. See Kellie Schmidt, McDermott Will to Add Lower-Paid Associates, RECORDER,
Nov. 2, 2007, http://www.law.com/jsp/llf/PubArticleLLF.jsp?id=l 193907832842. The
article quoted a general counsel on the move: "I think McDermott is on a good mission: 'Let
us find a way to the make the cost more reasonable so you'll continue to hire us."' Id.
137. See Zusha Elinson, Thelen Reid Responds to Associate Raises with a Two-Tier
Pay Scale, RECORDER, June 25, 2007, _http://www.law.com/jsp/llf/
PubArticleLLF.jsp?id=l 182762353558. The article also noted that "Fenwick & West went
to a similar system when it raised salaries in May, letting associates choose between an
1,800-hour or 1,950-hour pay scale." Id.
138. Lynne Marek, Chicago Firms Asks Associates to Choose Between Pay Levels,
NAT'L L.J., Oct. 11, 2007 (reporting that firm declined to discuss specifics for "competitive
reasons").
139. See Posting of David Lat to Above the Law, Associate Bonus Watch: Open
Thread for Firms That Have Nixed Special Bonuses, http://www.abovethelaw.coml
2007/12/associatebonus_watch open thr.php (Dec. 18, 2007, 13:20 EST) ("We've heard
complaints from numerous associates claiming that their law firms are using vague bonus
policies to lowball them on bonuses.").
140. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Lawyers Compete, Except in Bonuses, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 2, 2007, at 8 (reporting how other New York "white-shoe" firms fall in line after
Cravath, Swaine & Moore announced associates bonuses of $45,000 to $110,000, depending
upon seniority, and commenting that this perennial "copycat mode" is "absolutely irrational,
economically speaking").
141. Recent data suggests that graduates of elite law schools strongly gravitate toward
more elite firms with higher partners per profits and higher midlevel salaries and bonuses
despite longer workweeks and less family-friendly work conditions. See Henderson &
Zaring, supra note 58, at 1099 & tbl.3.
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business and human capital strategies for lawyers. This may be an opportunity
for a new generation of "Millennial" lawyers to infuse the legal profession with
a new set of values and work habits.142 This topic is taken up again in Part
III.C.
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE LEGAL PROFESSION
The principal claim of this Article is that the large law firm sector has
gradually moved from the classic promotion-to-partner tournament, which was
characterized by a fairly constant and reliable set of rules that limited the
options of associates and partners, to the elastic model, which promotes,
laterally hires, or de-equitizes partners in order to maximize profits for a
proportionately smaller equity class. Yet, notwithstanding the protestations of
many commentators, who lament the excessive commercialism and business-
orientation of large law firms, 143 the shift to the elastic tournament is not
simply the product of unrestrained greed or the loss of the profession's moral
compass. The elastic tournament reflects a wide-scale adaptation to major
structural changes in the marketplace, including the globalization of corporate
clients, the bureaucratization of corporate legal departments, the lower cost and
greater availability of information, and erosion of cohesive firm culture due to
sheer size and geographic dispersion. 144 But it is an adaptation that confers
disproportionate power on the most single-minded pursuers of the bottom
line. 1
4 5
This sea change is evident in the harried workplace endured by equity
partners, who already hold the proverbial brass ring. As alluded to earlier,
142. See, e.g., Stephanie Francis Ward, The Ultimate Time-Money Trade-Off ABA J.,
Feb. 2007, at 24. Susan C. Robinson, associate dean for career services at Stanford Law
School, is quoted in the article: "The supposed characterization of the millennials is that they
are not as willing to compromise life and family for work." Id. at 25.
143. See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS ch. 2 (1994)
(discussing transformation of large firm practice since 1960s and how emphasis on
profitability has marginalized longstanding ideals of the profession); KRONMAN, supra note
95, at 4 (stating that explosive growth of law firms has "created a new, more openly
commercial culture in which the lawyer-statesman ideal has only a marginal place");
LINOWITZ, supra note 98, at 31 ("Money is, of course, at the heart of the problem. Law as a
profession can carry many burdens, but it cannot carry a code of values that ranks money
very high among those virtues."); DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE:
REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION 37 (2000) ("[Pjreoccupation with the bottom line has
squeezed out other values that are central to a satisfying professional life.").
144. One large law firm partner has made a similar observation. See MICHAEL H.
TROTTER, PROFIT AND THE PRACTICE OF LAW xviii (1997) ("[E]fforts to revive the lost and
lamented professionalism of the bar are doomed to failure, because the change in lawyers'
behavior result from fundamental changes in the economics, structure, and functioning of the
profession and changes in the business world to which it relates.").
145. GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 14, at 127-29; Marc Galanter & Thomas Palay,
Large Law Firm Misery: It's the Tournament, Not the Money, 52 VAND. L. REv. 953, 967-
68 (1999).
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many of these partners would gladly trade a portion of their earnings for a
shorter workweek, greater job security, more interesting work, the opportunity
to mentor (or be mentored), do more pro bono work, or take a long,
uninterrupted vacation. 14 6 Yet, these aspirations are virtually impossible to
negotiate when rainmaking partners located in multiple offices through the
world are free to exit at any time with clients in tow. This outcome is dictated
not by an absence of professional ideals but a widening and intractable
collective action problem that undermines the requisite conditions for the
embodiment of those ideals.
14 7
For the vast majority of modem large law firms, economics rather than
culture are the glue that holds the firm together. Indeed, the distinguishing
feature of the elastic tournament is a constant focus on the real or imagined
marginal product of each lawyer in the firm-associates, of counsel, sundry
off-track attorneys, and equity and non-equity partners. Although this system is
remarkably effective at maximizing the financial return on (at least some)
human capital, it simultaneously undermines or hinders other values cherished
by the profession.
Part III briefly explores how the pervasive incentives of the elastic
tournament affect three such values. Subpart A suggests that the mobility of
corporate lawyers and clients has eroded the market power of individual
lawyers and law firms, which is a precondition of the alleged independence and
superior ethics of large firm lawyers. Subpart B argues that under the elastic
tournament, equity partnership is likely to remain an elusive goal for minority
and female lawyers. Finally, Subpart C asks if and how large law firms can
accommodate a new generation of lawyers who are demanding a more flexible
and balanced work environment.
A. Decline of Large Firms as Exemplars of Legal Ethics
Throughout the twentieth century, the elite corporate bar has perpetuated
the lore that its organizations and individual members adhere to strict standards
of professionalism rather than the morals of the marketplace. 148 This image is
146. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
147. As some commentators have noted, the problems spawned by lawyer mobility are
made possible by longstanding ethics rules that forbid noncompete contracts among lawyers.
See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Ethical Rules, Agency Costs, and Law Firm Structure, 84 VA. L.
REv. 1707, 1730-38 (1998) (discussing background of and rationale for the legal
profession's ban on noncompete contracts between lawyers, now codified as Rule 5.6 of the
Model Rules of Professional Responsibility, and its deleterious effects on firm loyalty and
the creation of firm specific capital).
148. See, e.g., Leslie C. Levin, The Ethical World of Solo and Small Law Firm
Practitioners, 41 HOUs. L. REv. 309, 310-12 (2004) (discussing efforts of the corporate
lawyers in New York and Chicago, who dominated bar organizations, to use the ethics rules
to police business-getting practices of ethnic, urban solo and small firm lawyers who
practiced in areas such as personal injury and criminal law).
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reinforced within the popular culture by the tort reform movement, which casts
plaintiffs' lawyers as greedy and unprincipled. 149 Solo and small firm lawyers
are also perennially overrepresented in state bar disciplinary proceedings
because of higher levels of client complaints and alleged ethics violations.
150
Conversely, as observed by Lisa Lerman, "[s]ome of the wealthiest American
lawyers-partners in large firms-have enjoyed a widespread assumption that
their ethical standards are impeccable."' 51
In a seminal study on lawyer ethics conducted during the early 1960s,
lawyer and sociologist Jerome Carlin provided compelling empirical evidence
that large firm lawyers were much more likely to comport with the bar's formal
and informal ethics regime. 152 Drawing upon interviews with lawyers, legal
ethics texts, and published opinions of committees on professional ethics,
Carlin's research team devised a detailed questionnaire that set forth a wide
array of ethical conflicts in contexts involving a lawyer's obligations to clients,
colleagues, or the administration of justice. 15 3 The questionnaire was then
149. See, e.g., Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, "The Impact that It Has Had Is
Between People's Ears ": Tort Reform, Mass Culture, and Plaintiffs' Lawyers, 50 DEPAUL L.
REV. 453, 466-72 (2000) (documenting insurance industry funding of an elaborate public
relations campaign since 1970s to shape public opinion on tort reform, often casting the
plaintiffs' lawyer as the villain); Marc Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell: Contemporary
Legends about the Civil Justice System, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 717, 749 (1998) (quoting president
of the United States Chamber of Commerce on launch of a campaign against "class action
suits and ambulance chasing trial lawyers, who suck billions of dollars out of consumers and
companies."). See generally WILLIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL MCCANN, DISTORTING THE LAW:
POLITICS, MEDIA, AND THE LITIGATION CRISIS (2004) (marshalling overwhelming evidence
that tort cases, litigation rates, and plaintiff success are dramatically exaggerated in the
media, thus fomenting support for tort reform).
150. See Levin, supra note 148, at 312-15 (collecting large array of statistics and
sources that document higher incidences of complaints and disciplinary action against solo
and small firm lawyers and exploring reasons for disparity, including difference in client
base, ability to detect unethical behavior, and institutional biases); cf David B. Wilkins, Who
Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 801, 822-33 (1992) (analyzing relative
effectiveness of other controls (reputations, malpractice) in dealing with under-serving of
clients in corporate sector).
151. Lisa G. Lerman, Blue-Chip Bilking: Regulation of Billing and Expense Fraud by
Lawyers, 1999 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 205, 227; see also Magali Sarfatti Larson, On the
Nostalgic View of Lawyers' Role: Comment on Kagan and Rosen's "On the Social
Significance of Large Firm Practice", 37 STAN. L. REV. 445, 456 (1985) (arguing that
professional ethics "have their best anchor and support" in large firms because "they can
afford to be ethical" and "one of the main services they sell is legitimation"); Amy R.
Mashburn, Professionalism as Class Ideology: Civility Codes and Bar Hierarchy, 28 VAL.
U. L. REV. 657, 675-77 (1994) (discussing how prestige and power of large law firm practice
has become conflated with "moral authority to make judgments about the standards of
professional behavior that will bind others" in legal profession and citing studies that
correlate large firm practitioners with perceptions of more ethical behavior).
152. See JEROME E. CARLIN, LAWYERS' ETHICS: A SURVEY OF THE NEW YORK CITY
BAR 119-32 (1966).
153. Id. at 42-47 (describing construction and content of survey questionnaire). As a
preliminary check on the questionnaire's reliability, Carlin's research team asked a group of
1908 [Vol. 60:1867
THE ELASTIC TOURNAMENT
administered via interview to a representative sample of 800 lawyers in private
practice in the central business core of New York City. 154 One of the major
findings of Carlin's study was that large firm lawyers were much more likely to
conform to, and internalize, the bar's formal and informal code of ethics.
1 55
Yet, as Carlin unpacked his findings, he observed that the different rates of
ethical violation and conformity were not the product of firm size per se, but
with the presence or absence of ethical stressors that were strongly correlated
with different clientele and practice settings. In general, lawyers in the largest
New York City firms enjoyed the largest incomes, the most stable base of
clients, the fewest appearances in state courts (which were the most rife with
corruption), less pressure from clients to violate the law, and the time and
resources to participate in elite bar associations.1 56 Thus, inspecting all the
data, Carlin concluded, "[l]arge-firm lawyers... have low rates of violation
because they are largely insulated from client and court-agency pressures,
while small-firm lawyers and individual practitioners have high rates of
violation because they are most exposed to these situational inducements to
violate." 15
7
A lot has changed in the forty years since Carlin published his study. The
large firm lawyers studied by Carlin enjoyed enduring client relationships.
According to a 1959 Conference Board survey of 286 manufacturing
companies, "three fourths of them retain outside counsel on a continuing
basis .... Companies more frequently report that 'present outside counsel have
been with us for many, many years,' or that 'we are satisfied with the
performance of our outside counsel and have never given any thought to hiring
another."' 15 8 Only a few years after the publication of Carlin's study, another
commentator on Wall Street law firms observed that the large commercial and
investment banks were the "epitome of the locked-in client" because of the vast
specialized knowledge that had accumulated within by the firms' large banking
lawyer-informants to rate ten to twelve colleagues as ethical or unethical. The ethics
scenarios were then presented to several dozen of these "rated" lawyers. The questions on
the final survey instrument were those in which the lawyer-respondents answers had a
reasonable correspondence to the ratings of the lawyer-informants. Id.
154. Id. at 8-9 (discussing how sample was assembled).
155. Some of the behavior more likely to be deemed unethical by large firm lawyers
included acceptance of a commission without telling a client, accepting a referral fee, the
sending of Christmas cards to clients (then viewed as form of business solicitation), turning a
blind eye to a client's bribe of a government official, agreeing to represent one of two
partners he previously represented after a business controversy develops, or disregarding an
oral contract with another lawyer on a real estate transaction. Id. at 51-57 & tbls.32-36.
156. Id. at 119-24.
157. Id. at 122. Moreover, Carlin found that the different ethical outlooks and behavior
of lawyers from different religious and ethnic backgrounds were entirely a function of being
channeled into specific legal contexts and practice settings. Id. at 124.
158. GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 14, 32-34 (citing Nat'l Indus. Conference Bd.,
Organization of Legal Work, 16 CoNF. BD. Bus. REc. 463,464 (1959)).
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departments. 159 One Wall Street partner estimated that client turnover during
the 1960s, in dollar volume, was "5 per cent a year, mostly in one-shot
litigation."'
160
Ironically, Carlin's descriptions of the pressures surrounding small firm
lawyers in the 1960s seem to apply aptly to today's large law firm marketplace.
The lower the status of the lawyer's clientele, the more precarious and
insecure his practice. Lawyers with low-status clients tend to have an unstable
clientele; that is, they have a higher rate of [client] turnover .... The small
businessman is more likely than a large corporation to shop around and switch
attorneys: he may be on the lookout for a less expensive, sharper, and more
compatible lawyer. This type of client is also more likely to divide his legal
business among several lawyers .... Lawyers with low-status clients also
report more competition from other lawyers in obtaining clients, and that they
have been hurt by such competition.
16 1
John Conley and Scott Baker recently observed, "the Wall Street elite now
occupy that circle of hell that Carlin had reserved for the most desperate of solo
practitioners."'
162
In Kimberly Kirkland's recent qualitative empirical study of ten large law
firms, 163 many factors contributed to the climate of insecurity. Partners
reported that "firms no longer 'own' the work they do because" a competitor is
always working to lure the client away.164 Because the firm can no longer
predictably hand off clients as older partners retire, younger lawyers are less
likely to develop strong loyalties to the firm, 165 which further undermines the
project of developing firm-specific capital. Firm management evaluates the
profitability of partners and practice groups by focusing on hours billed and fee
collection (i.e., "realization"), 166 which, in turn, fosters competition within the
firm for marketing expenditures, equity partnership seats, and new hires.
167
159. PAUL HOFFMAN, LIoNs IN THE STREET: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE GREAT WALL
STREET LAW FIRMS 76 (1973) ("[It's virtually impossible for a bank-even if it chose-to
switch to another firm.").
160. Id. at 72.
161. CARLIN, supra note 152, at 66-67.
162. John M. Conley & Scott Baker, Fall From Grace or Business as Usual? A
Retrospective Look at Lawyers on Wall Street and Main Street, 30 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 783,
791 (2005) (applying this characterization to the narrative of REGAN, supra note 7); cf
REGAN, supra note 7, at 36 (discussing the "perpetual instability" experienced by modem
day large firm lawyers); TROTTER, supra note 144, at 194 ("The number one problem faced
by major business practice firm lawyers today is the increased uncertainty about what the
future holds ....").
163. See Kirkland, supra note 85.
164. Id. at 675.
165. Id. at 676. Kirkland quotes a former managing partner, "Today, a lawyer needs to
build skills. Yesterday, a lawyer needed to build a practice. A lawyer today is more of a
hired gun, less the owner of a small business." Id.
166. Id. at 669.
167. Id. at 678. Kirkland later quotes another large firm lawyer: "The whole system is
self-interest driven, but no one talks about it this way. Everyone talks about it as an altruistic
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Similarly, the conflict of interest checks are a frequent source of tension
because individual lawyers or practice groups could be forced to turn away
lucrative business. 68 Even if an individual partner manages to cement a strong
business relationship with a corporate general counsel, that security could be
disrupted by higher firm-imposed billing rates that the client is unwilling to
pay. 169 Further, the specter of de-equitization hangs over all lawyers who are
slow to adapt.170 "Large firms view good lawyers as expendable.
17 1
Several commentators have argued that market power is a necessary
precondition of professional values, including adherence to the formal ethical
norms of the bar. 172 According to Erwin Smigel's sociological account of large
Wall Street law firms of the 1960s, large law firms flourished economically
because their clients were paying a premium for expert and autonomous
advice.1 73 "Independent legal opinion is perhaps the commodity they offer, and
the primary commodity for which they are paid."' 174 Even if Smigel accurately
described the client-firm relationship of the late 1950s and early 1960s, 175 now
there is broad consensus that the vast majority of corporate clients hire outside
counsel to obtain a specific, cost-effective result. 176 Not surprisingly, as
system or talks about it in a communal sense. But so much of what partners are doing is
being done to promote their own value." Id. at 702.
168. Id. at 672 ("When a conflict cannot be waived... decisions about which client to
take and which to turn away are made at the highest levels of firm management.").
169. Id. at 675 (reporting that a partner squeezed by higher billing rates must either
find new clients or move to another firm that charges lower rates).
170. Id. at 678. Kirkland quoted one equity partner: "[The firm needs to] cut out the
dogs. Get rid of the partner whose practice has died. Every two or three years [the firm needs
to] look closely and make the hard decisions-look at production versus salary. Nip the
thing in the bud and de-equitize the couch potatoes." Id.
171. Id. at 690.
172. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand-
Side Perspective, 49 MD. L. REv. 869, 916 (1990) ("[A] necessary condition for
professionalism is market power."); Regan, supra note 119, at 4 ("[S]ome respite from
market demands is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for fostering noneconomic
values.").
173. SMIGEL,supra note 31, at 343.
174. Id.
175. Some commentators have expressed doubt. See, e.g., HEINZ & LAUMANN, supra
note 44, at 365-73 (observing in a large-scale empirical study of Chicago lawyers during
mid-1970s that corporate lawyers had less autonomy than their small firm counterparts).
176. See, e.g., GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 14, at 50 (reviewing evidence that
routine legal work is now done increasingly by in-house lawyers while the relationship with
outside counsel has been less exclusive and based on "more task-specific ad hoc
arrangements"); GLENDON, supra note 143, at 83-84 ("[In emerging legal ethos, a] lawyer
who takes his duties to the court and the legal system seriously will often be at a
disadvantage against a less scrupulous adversary.... [G]ood ethics may not make for good
business."); LNOWITZ, supra note 98, at 111 ("If current trends continue, the corporate
counsel's job increasingly is going to be the purchase of legal services from what
management considers more or less a commodity market of large law firms"); RHODE, supra
note 143, at 9 (discussing erosion of longstanding and stable client relations, thus making it
"risky for counsel to protest unreasonable demands or to deliver unwelcome messages about
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extensive qualitative field work has revealed, the ethical norm that is most
widely embraced by large firm lawyers is the very one that reduces the strains
in the lawyer-client relationship: zealous advocacy. 1
77
Observing the transfer of market power from large law firm lawyers
(supply-side) to corporate general counsel (demand-side), Ronald Gilson has
argued that the best hope for rekindling the ideal of professional independence
is to focus on the conduct and obligations of in-house lawyers. 178 Yet, Robert
Nelson and Laura Beth Nielsen's empirical work on corporate legal
departments suggests the emergence of a bureaucratic structure that favors
entrepreneurial lawyers who privilege the company's commercial interests
above strict standards of professionalism. Nelson and Nielsen's subjects
reported dealing with extremely aggressive executives who were focused on
cost-containment, short-term profits, and the minimal amount of legal drag on
company transactions. 179 "With a few notable exceptions, the lawyers we
interviewed (like their nonlawyer peers) were literally absorbed in a high-
pressure corporate environment. They appeared far more concerned with
pursuing corporate profits than with pursuing the public good."'
' 80
Under the elastic tournament's regime of mobility, the structural
implications for outside counsel are virtually impossible to ignore. In the pages
of The American Lawyer, one large firm partner, who temporarily served as a
what legal rules or legal ethics require"); TROTTER, supra note 144, at 195 (large firm partner
reporting on persistent "danger that the client will hire an ambitious counsel who will want
to take more work in-house or to put your part of the company's business up for competitive
bidding.").
177. See NELSON, supra note 17, at 271-72 (concluding at the end of a case study of
four large Chicago law firms that retention of clients demands that lawyers "present
themselves as zealous advocates"); Robert W. Gordon, The Ethical Worlds of Large-Firm
Litigators: Preliminary Observations, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 709, 728 (1998)
(acknowledging, by researcher in American Bar Foundation's Ethics: Beyond the Bar Study,
the primacy of zealous advocacy); Kirkland, supra note 85, at 718 (concluding, based on her
own field work, that partners have strong incentives "not to act as autonomous counselors
who serve as a check on their clients' desires, but as agents of their clients"); Suchman,
supra note 99, at 854 (concluding, by researcher in American Bar Foundation's Ethics:
Beyond the Bar Study after extensive interviews with large firm litigators, that zealous
advocacy was viewed as "an affirmative moral obligation, even when it came into conflict
with other ethical rules."); see also GLENDON, supra note 6, at 38 ("The traditional ideal of
lawyers that has flourished most in the new atmosphere is client loyalty with its concomitant
duty of zealous representation.").
178. See Gilson, supra note 172, at 913-15 (applying economic analysis to market for
corporate legal service and concluding that the "best (and only) candidate for the next
generation of private gatekeeper" is the inside lawyer).
179. See Robert L. Nelson & Laura Beth Nielsen, Cops, Counsel, and Entrepreneurs:
Constructing the Role of Inside Counsel in Large Corporations, 34 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 457,
487 (2000) (concluding that in-house lawyers have "attempted to craft a new image within
the corporation in which lawyers are team players, rather than cops.").
180. Id. at 490; see also LINOWITZ, supra note 98, at 84 ("Increasingly... CEOs want
their general counsel to have the same exclusive loyalty to the company that they expect
from employees who do not have professional responsibilities.").
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client's in-house counsel, offered two golden rules to solidify their client
relationships: "[m]ake inside counsel's lives easier" and "[m]ake inside counsel
look good in front of their clients, colleagues, superiors, and subordinates."' 181
In some instances, the outside lawyer is hired to reinforce to company
executives the position staked out by the general counsel, and if he or she wants
to be hired again, "it behoove[s] him [or her] not to offer a contrary
opinion." 182 In this highly atomized economic climate, it is likely that ethical
gray zones will get resolved in the client's favor, and insecure lawyers will be
less likely to acknowledge any black or white.
Let us be clear, however, that our discussion oversimplifies the history,
culture, and governance of a wide array of large firms. In our discussions with
lawyers, we have run across examples of large law firms that continue to share-
risk and inspire investment in the collective enterprise of the firm. Ethical
lapses were regarded as threats to a hallowed firm reputation and the trust of
longtime colleagues. But this ethos becomes harder to maintain (and virtually
impossible to create or restore) in larger, geographically dispersed firms that
are perpetually competing for clients and entry-level associates.
B. Challenges for Racial and Gender Diversity
Drawing upon ample empirical evidence, we have described a large law
firm marketplace in which individual lawyers who hope to obtain, or maintain,
partnership status have a strong incentive to maximize their economic value to
the firm. Yet, the long term financial interests of associates, partners, and firm
management are not necessarily aligned. Partners have an interest in
maximizing the value of their client relationships in order to guard their income
and obtain leverage over the strategic direction of the firm. Associates have an
interest in receiving the training and work assignments necessary to ensure that
their skill set keeps pace with their hourly rate, which, in turn, fuels demand for
their services or, at a minimum, enhances their outplacement prospects. Firm
management is in the unenviable situation of managing a vast, multiple office
business in which its most valuable assets "go home at night." '183 Although it
would like to develop firm-specific capital that cements the client to the firm
rather than powerful (and mobile) lawyers, ethics rules bar lawyers from
181. Gary F. Torrell, How to Work with In-House Counsel, AM. LAW., July-Aug. 1992,
at 32.
182. LINOWITZ, supra note 98, at 83 (opining how clients had changed during his sixty
year career). Similarly, Mary Ann Glendon observes, "[m]ost lawyers these days are
perfectly decent people who feel like they're trapped in a system that they don't really like,
but a system that they don't feel safe trying to buck." According to Glendon, the new rules
are simple: "[k]eep your head down, don't ask questions and bill as much as you can." David
Segal, In the Business of Billing? Lawyers Say a Rush for Money Is Shaking Profession's
Standards, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 1998, at H1 (quoting Glendon).
183. MATTHEW PARSON, EFFECTIVE KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT FOR LAW FIRMS 4
(2004) (quoting chairman of an international law firm).
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contracting away their right to exit the finn. 184 Firms cannot credibly engender
loyalty through long-term employment agreements because the terms may, over
time, become disadvantageous to mobile partners. Further, the sheer size and
dispersion of most firms reduces the potential of pervasive firm-wide cultural
norms. 185
Thus, to stave off firm instability, firm management is likely to adopt the
relatively modest goal of rewarding the lawyers at their real or perceived
marginal product, thus staving off firm instability by balancing unwanted
attrition with effective recruitment. Unfortunately, this pure marginal product
ethos reflects incentives at the individual-lawyer level that are likely to
perpetuate the marginalized status of minority and female lawyers, though the
reasons are different for each group. These dynamics can be described as
follows.
1. Minority Lawyers
In the modem large law firms, all associates who hope to ascend to the
equity partnership (inner core) level, regardless of gender or ethnicity, must
acquire the requisite skills and professional experience. This enhancement of
human capital occurs within the firm through training, mentoring, and an
appropriate array of challenging work assignments. David Wilkins and Mitu
Gulati have referred to these valued goods as the "Royal Jelly" of elite large
law, which is an analogy to the social structure of bees: "If a bee larvae is fed a
rich nutrient (called 'Royal Jelly') by the queen, that bee will develop into a
queen. If that same bee receives no Royal Jelly, it will develop into a worker
bee. Training is the Royal Jelly of elite law firms." 186 Elsewhere, Wilkins and
Gulati have cogently argued that the limited supply of coveted work
assignments are not distributed equally among entering associates, but
according to a "tracking and seeding" process that favors associates based on
credentials, personal attributes, and performance during the early stages of a
"multi-round" tournament. 187 Because training work involves a substantial
investment of valuable partner time, Wilkins and Gulati assert that firms have a
powerful incentive to allocate it during each round to those associates, albeit
based on limited information, with the best long-term prospects of
partnership. 188
184. See HILLMAN, supra note 86, § 2.3.4 (reviewing formal strictures and case law on
agreements discouraging lawyer competition); Ribstein, supra note 147, at 1731 & nn. 108-
11 (discussing bar on agreement not to compete and collecting cases).
185. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
186. See David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers in
Corporate Law Firms? An Institutional Analysis, 84 CAL. L. REv. 493, 541 (1996)
(attributing the analogy to Ian Ayres).
187. See Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 14, at 1641-57.
188. Id. at 1643 ("Since training work involves a substantial investment of valuable
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Yet, one of the key analytical insights of the elastic tournament is that "the
firm" has precious little bargaining leverage with partners who preside over the
best training opportunities. 189 Although the uneven distribution of work
assignments may appear to be the result of a tracking and seeding process, the
actual outcome (or equilibrium) is primarily the result of an internal labor
market in which partners and associates fend for themselves. Because no one's
standing in the firm is secure or permanent, powerful partners have strong
incentives to hoard associates with the most impressive credentials, the most
tireless work ethic, and the most undivided loyalty to the individual partner. 
190
According to one large firm partner quoted in a recent ABA monograph,
the scramble for desirable associates begins immediately with each entering
class:
[Through] a kind of implicit tracking system.., some young lawyers very
soon, if not the day after they arrive or the day before they arrive, are
identified as superstars and get special assignments and are sought after by all
the partners who have a chance to compete for them. I do this. I have a very
sexy practice. I dangle it before the people who seem to me to be the best in
the associate pool . . . . I train the hell out of them because that is part of the
bargain .... The large number are not going to have that happen ... and they
are going to do a lot more routine work.
19 1
In another recent ABA monograph, a large firm lawyer emphasized the
crucial importance of obtaining a mentor from the "very beginning" to make
sure "you don't get stuck on huge document reviews and to make sure that you
get good work. People pick their protrgrs really quickly, and if you are left out
it's going to be really tough for you."
' 192
partner time, firms only want to give this work to associates who are likely to have long-term
careers with the firm .... ).
189. Drawing upon her qualitative research in ten large law firms, Kimberley Kirkland
aptly describes the dilemma:
Although a powerful practice group leader may limit the autonomy of many lawyers within
the group, profitable partners may be able to purchase a degree of autonomy that others in the
group cannot. For instance, while a firm may officially require all partners to prepare a
business plan, a practice group leader may ignore the requirement for a very profitable
partner, or a highly profitable partner may be able to charge a client a lower hourly rate than
other partners would be permitted to charge for a new matter. Lawyers at the highest levels
of management identify one of the central tensions in large firms today as whether
management is able to control decisions in the areas outlined above, i.e., whether
management can decline to follow the wishes of a significant partner and still maintain
power.
Kirkland, supra note 85, at 673.
190. See id. at 680, 682, 691 (observing that "lawyers who work for other lawyers
must understand that their supervisors are their primary 'clients"', that superiors "expect the
lawyers who work for them to be responsive to clients needs '24/7,"' and that lack of
accurate information reinforces the tendency among lawyers to "rely on perceptions [based
on paper credentials and limited interactions] to make judgments about one another").
191. ELIZABETH CHAMBLISS, MILES TO Go: PROGRESS OF MINORITIES IN THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 79 (2004) (quoting "a senior partner at a top law firm").
192. JANET E. GANS EPNER, VISIBLE INVISIBILITY: WOMEN OF COLOR IN LAW FIRMS 12-
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As an empirical matter, there is substantial evidence that minority
associates in large law firms are less likely to get coveted work assignments or
develop alliances with powerful partners. For example, in his analysis based on
the After the JD Project (AJD), which is a large-scale longitudinal study of
young lawyers who took the bar in 2000, Richard Sander found that black,
Asian, and Hispanic associates in firms of 100 or more attorneys were much
more likely than their white counterparts to want to leave the firm. 193
Additional AD questions suggest some reasons why. Among black associates,
where the desire to leave the firm was the strongest, respondents were much
more likely to express a desire for more or better training and more or better
mentoring by senior attorneys. 194 Black associates were also less likely to
report working on nine or more matters during the last six months 195 and more
likely to have spent over 100 hours on document review or performing due
diligence.19 6 Similarly, blacks reported a lower likelihood of (a) being
responsible for keeping the client updated, (b) being involved in the
formulation of strategy, (c) handling an entire matter on their own, (d) joining
partners for breakfast or lunch meetings, and (e) spending recreational time
with partners. 197 Hispanic and Asian associates often reported only slightly
better experiences, yet still below the levels enjoyed by their majority
counterparts. Comparing this data with other respondent attributes, Sander
points out that these differences in treatment correspond with group differences
on law school grades. 1
98
13 (2006); see also Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 14, at 566 ("Although managing partners
understandably continue to deny that firms track incoming associates, more detached
observers, as well as partners in more candid moments, report the contrary." (footnotes
omitted)).
193. See Richard H. Sander, The Racial Paradox of the Corporate Law Firm, 84 N.C.
L. REv. 1755, 1796-98 & tbl.16 (2006) (differences significant at the p < 0.05 level).
194. Id. tbl.17 (differences significant at the p < 0.05 level).
195. Id. tbl.18 (differences significant at the p < 0.05 level).
196. Id. tbl.19 (differences significant at the p < 0.05 level).
197. Id. tbls.19 & 20 (differences significant at the p < 0.05 level).
198. Id. at 1758-59 (reporting empirical evidence that minority candidates receive
hiring preferences in large firms but "their opportunities to learn and perform once inside the
firm are, in some ways, distinctly inferior"). Sander's "Racial Paradox" analysis has
attracted a lot of criticism, primarily because of Sander's hypothesis that the disparate work
assignments and mentoring between blacks and white is rooted in a skills deficit that arises
in law school due to a mismatch of credentials. See, e.g., James E. Coleman, Jr. & Mitu
Gulati, A Response to Professor Sander: Is It Really All About the Grades?, 84 N.C. L. REv.
1823, 1824-27 (2006) (praising Sander for "document[ing] how the experiences of black
associates-in terms of key developmental factors such as mentorship, quality of
assignments, and training-are perceived by them to be systematically worse than those of
their white colleagues" but strongly disputing his conclusion, triangulated from multiple
datasets, that these dynamics are driven by lower ability as allegedly measured by law school
grades). Our analysis, however, does not depend upon this interpretation. Rather, the mere
perception of lower ability based on stereotype is enough to reduce the flow of coveted work
assignments and training opportunities. See, e.g., Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 14, at 569-70
("[T]he decision about who is a superstar worthy of training will be made as an initial matter
1916 [Vol. 60:1867
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A recent ABA Commission of Women study, which focused primarily of
large firm lawyers, found that minority respondents were less likely to have
developed an informal mentoring relationship-the most effective for career
advancement-with a white male lawyer. 199 Among minority attomeys, 67%
of females and 52% of the male reported a desire for more and bettering
mentoring by senior attorneys and partners, compared to 55% for white females
and 32% for white males. Minority lawyers were also more likely to be
passed over for desirable work assignments.20 1 Similarly, in the 2006 Midlevel
Associate survey published annually by The American Lawyer, black associates
report lower satisfaction with level of responsibility, amount of client contact,
peer collegiality, partner relations, and fairness in the distribution of work.2 °2
Not surprisingly, a chorus of diversity managers and consultants advise that a
key element of minority retention is ensuring fair allocation of work
assignments, better training and feedback, and strong mentoring from
partners.
20 3
Although most large law firms have responded to calls for greater diversity
by aggressively recruiting minority associates, 20 4 this benefit is evenly spread
in the same way as it is done at the recruiting stage-based on a few easily observable
signals such as law school status, academic honors, and grades. . . . Under these
circumstances, background prejudices and preconceptions can lead white partners to believe
that black associates are more likely to be average or perhaps even unacceptable.").
199. EPNER, supra note 192, at 12-13 & tbl.1.
200. Id. at 12.
201. Id. at 21. As a group, however, white and minority woman both fared worse than
their male counterparts. Id.
202. D.M. Osborne, Diversity of Opinion, MINORrrY L.J., Nov. 1, 2006,
http://www.law.com/jsp/law/PubArticlePrinterFriendly.jsp?id=l 166004315371 (breaking
out and comparing statistics by race). Similar results were reported for 2007, though the lack
of training, mentoring, and quality work was most pronounced for minority females. See
D.M. Osborne, Why Are Minority Female Associates Leaving Law Firms?, MINORITY L.J.,
Nov. 7, 2007, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1 194343441401.
203. See, e.g., Karen Asner, Best Practices in Implementing Law Firm Diversity
Programs, N.J. L.J., Apr. 30, 2007, at 32 ("Professional development staff.., can monitor
the work assignments of associates, ensuring that work is evenly distributed and that career-
making opportunities are afforded to a diverse group of associates."); Joseph W. Hatchett &
Danielle T. Shannon, Firms That Don't Recognize the Value of a Diverse Workplace Will
Lose Attorneys and Clients, BROWARD DAILY Bus. REv., June 4, 2007, at 14 (advising firms
that want to retain minority associates to "[e]stablish a formal mentoring program,"
"[p]rovide professional skills development," and "[r]eview work assignments and hours
billed to ensure that minority attorneys are not being excluded from key client matters");
Edgardo Ramos & Lynn Anne Baronas, What Works: Ways to Increase Diversity at Law
Firms, NAT'L L. J., Jan. 16, 2006, at 13 (encouraging development of firm mentorship
programs to monitor minority associates' hours and ensure professional growth through
quality work assignments); Karen Jackson Vaughn & Cynthia R. White, Winning the War
for Talent, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 24, 2007, at 7 (advising firms seeking to retain
minority associates to "provid[e] equal access to quality work assignments" and training in
"business development, leadership development and presentation skills").
204. See, e.g., Leigh Jones, Law Firms Digging Deeper on Campus, NAT'L L.J., Dec.
15, 2005, at 1. The article reported that, in response to client demands, "most big law firms
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throughout the firm and thus is unlikely to encounter much resistance. In
contrast, law firm partners trying to improve or maintain their standing in the
firm have an incentive to favor associates who will benefit their individual
practice. Unfortunately, there are host of factors that could cause a partner to
favor a white associate over his or her minority counterpart: (i) lower law
school grades, (ii) a high probability that the minority lawyer will leave (a
historical reality at most firms), or (iii) a perception that mentorship will be
more labor-intensive because of awkward cultural barriers. As many law firm
observers have noted, informal training and mentoring in most large law firms
are on the wane because partners are reluctant to invest the time beyond what is
necessary to optimize their own practices. 20 5 Hence, powerful partners can
internalize a proportionate share of the credit for aggressive minority
recruitment yet externalize the actual cost of minority associate development
and retention to rival partners or practice groups. Firm management can try to
realign the incentive structure,20 6 but powerful partners can vote with their feet
with clients in tow.207 This is a strong structural impediment to diverse
partnerships. If appeals to moral authority are our primary means of retaining
and promoting more minority lawyers in large firms, we should prepare
have boosted their efforts to diversify" and cited the example of Philadelphia-based Duane
Morris, which acknowledged, "We target four or five schools with strong minority
enrollments." Id
205. See, e.g., Fortney, supra note 116, at 281-82 (reporting on economic pressures
that cause partners to avoid "adequate mentoring, supervision, and communication" with
associates); Green, supra note 116, at 14 (reporting consensus among large-firm
practitioners that "high-quality-on-the-job training is on the wane" and citing pressure to bill,
client expectations for rapid response time, and pressure to keep costs down); Wilkins &
Gulati, supra note 186, at 538 ("[P]artners will have a preference for associates who need
little or no training.").
206. At least one West Coast firm has linked partner compensation to diversity goals.
See Jessie Seyfer, Color of Money: Diversity Isn't Just a Just a Slogan at Fenwick, It's
Partner Pay Dirt, RECORDER, Dec. 5, 2006, at 1 (reporting that Fenwick & West "closely
ties diversity goals to partners' compensation" by asking associates to evaluate partners on
diversity efforts). One of the hazards of this approach is that partners can, in effect, pay a
higher "tax" to avoid these responsibilities; and if the tax becomes excessive, they can leave.
Cf Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 7, at 538 ("Associate training is both a public good for the
firm and a private good for individual partners.").
207. There is also pressure for law firms to diversify in order to attract and retain
lucrative clients. See, e.g., David B. Wilkins, From "Separate Is Inherently Unequal" to
"Diversity Is Good for Business ": The Rise of Market-Based Diversity Arguments and the
Fate of the Black Corporate Bar, 117 HARV. L. REv. 1548, 1557 (2004) ("[Tlhe 'business
case' for diversity in the large law firms that seek to serve [Fortune 500] corporate clients
appears compelling indeed."). Yet, in his interviews with large law firm partners, which
covered the topic of client pressure to hire a more diverse workforce, John Conley observed
that most firms appeared to mollify clients that they are doing their best in recruitment and
that no large firm rivals are doing measurably better. Moreover, the partners pointed out that
clients had strong incentives not to trade down in firm quality. John M. Conley, Tales of
Diversity: Lawyers' Narratives of Racial Equity in Private Firms, 31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
831, 851 (2006) (citing informants' belief that perceived quality and prestige, often signaled
through high billing rates, bound clients to the firm).
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ourselves for disappointment.
2. Female Lawyers
The economic pressures of the elastic tournament also create significant
headwinds for female lawyers, albeit for reasons that only partially overlap
with minority lawyers. (Obviously, two sets of headwinds apply to female
minority lawyers.) Specifically, female associates also report a lower likelihood
of receiving coveted work assignments and training;20 8 but for women, this
trend is often attributable to disproportionate family responsibilities. 20 9 Within
the legal profession, married women with children typically face tradeoffs that
limit their ability to live up to the "24/7" demands of full-time large firm
practice. For example, in a survey of Indiana University School of Law alumni,
women and men married at comparable levels, yet their childcare burdens were
dramatically unequal. Only 1% of men five years out of law schools and 2% of
men fifteen years out reported having worked part-time or not worked due to
childcare, compared to 24% (five years out) and 40% (fifteen years out) for
female graduates.2 10 Moreover, female law graduates are more likely to have
married spouses with demanding professional careers, 21 1 which suggests that
neither spouse has the ability to privilege work over family. As the authors of
the study conclude, "These facts undoubtedly impact the future career paths of
our alumni."2 12
A forthcoming study of male and female Michigan Law Alumni-a group
well-represented in large, elite law firms-reveals strikingly similar childcare
and marriage patterns. 2 13 Yet, the more significant finding is that the total
number of hours worked by female Michigan law graduates has been steadily
208. See, e.g., EPNER, supra note 192, at 21 (reporting that among women, 44% of the
minority lawyers and 39% of the white lawyers reported unequal distribution of work
assignments, compared to 25% of the minority men lawyers and 2% of the white lawyers).
209. See, e.g., John P. Heinz, Kathleen E. Hull & Ava A. Harter, Lawyers and Their
Discontents: Findings from a Survey of the Chicago Bar, 74 IND. L.J. 735, 748-49 (1999) (in
study of the Chicago bar, finding that women lawyers are much more likely to report that
personal or family obligations have affected their career choices or work opportunities);
Deborah L. Rhode, Gender and the Profession: The No-Problem Problem, 30 HOFsTRA L.
REV. 1001, 1007 (2002) ("[Because of] substantial family commitments ... many female
attorneys . . . are not given enough challenging, high visibility assignments, nor are they
included in social events that yield professional opportunities.").
210. Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt et al., "The Pride of Indiana": An Empirical Study of
the Law School Experience and Careers of Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington
Alumni, 81 IND. L.J. 1427, 1448-51 & tbls.9 & 10 (2006).
211. Id. (delineating graduates by the proportion of spouses with "intense jobs").
212. Id. at 1451.
213. See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt et al., Gender and the Legal Profession: The
Michigan Alumni Data Set 1967-2000, at 19-20 tbls.Dl(5) & Dl(15), 24-25 tbls.El(5) &
E2(15) (Sept. 27, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=- 10 17362.
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declining over the last two decades. For graduates surveyed between 1981 and
1991, females fifteen years out of law school worked an average of 173 fewer
hours per year (2383 versus 2212); for respondents surveyed between 1996 and
2000, the gap between females and males had widened to 610 hours.
2 14
Although the typical male Michigan graduate fifteen years out now worked an
average of 2471 hours (an increase of over 100 hours per year), females had
decreased their hours to 1862 hours per year (-350 hours per year).2 15 The
overall decrease was due primarily to fewer hours worked by women with
childcare responsibilities; 2 16 by 2000, a female Michigan law graduate fifteen
years out had taken reduced-pay work for an average of fifty-eight months
during her career.2 17 These decisions, however, came at a price: female
Michigan law graduates who had taken time off for children were also less
likely to be law firm partners.
2 18
Examining the trend of Michigan Law graduates, it seems likely that more
women in large law firms are deciding to opt-out of the promotion-to-
partnership tournament, possibly in favor of positions as senior associate, of
counsel, or permanent non-equity partner-i.e., the outer mantle of the elastic
tournament. According to Kimberly Kirkland's qualitative study of large law
firms, associates on the "contender" track learn that the price of coveted work
assignments is grueling hours and loss of autonomy. In advising associates, one
equity partner told Kirkland, "You have to be available. You can't say no."
2 19
Another partner remarked that "the hours don't get better for partners; partners
have even more pressure than associates do." 220 According to another of
Kirkland's respondents, one of the pressures is building good relations with
other partners so that one can forestall de-equitization in the event of a setback
in one's practice. Asked how goodwill is built, the partner responded, "[I]t is
really about not saying no."
22 1
At a recent large law firm symposium, one senior partner described his
worklife in a way that amply justified his profit share:
Quite frankly, at sixty-one, I didn't expect to be answering a hundred voice
mails a day, two hundred emails a day, and on my way home at night, having
my partner, who is in Beijing, call me to discuss some issues, and when I got
home, having my wife look at me and say, "You had three or four calls from
folks. Such-and-such a client wants you to call back tonight." It has a very
significant impact on the quality of life. But the legal profession-it is that
slavish mistress. You can either practice a hundred percent or you can stop
214. See id. at 22, 24-25 tbls.El(5) & E2(15), graphs 7 & 8.
215. See id
216. See id. at 26 & graph 9.
217. Id. at 74.
218. Id. at 75.
219. Kirkland, supra note 85, at 680.
220. Id. at 683.
221. Id. at 685.
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practicing. It is very hard to practice part-time.
2 22
Regarding part-time work, Amelia Uelmen, who formerly worked as a
large firm associate, recounted her attempt to negotiate a reduced
hours/reduced pay arrangement with her employer. After three years at the
firm, "I was simply dropped from all my work, with no questions or discussion.
The partners avoided meeting my eyes in the elevator and the halls. It was as if
I had fallen off the planet."2 23 After begging a partner for work, Uelman was
placed on a massive document review project that lasted several months. She
then latched on to a lateral "of counsel" lawyer for the remainder of her time
with the firm.
224
The stark reality of the elastic tournament is that firm managers lack the
leverage to impose a top-down policy for the benefit of female lawyers with
children. 225 In an effort to improve its image for recruitment purposes, virtually
every firm has a policy that permits part-time work for lawyers. 226 Yet, to build
or retain their client base, equity partners are themselves under tremendous
pressure. Their lives are made easier by capable associates and junior partners
at their constant beck and call. This profile is at odds with a lawyer-parent who
has places a higher priority on her family.
C. Millennial Lawyers and the New Lifestyle Firm
As discussed earlier, there is empirical evidence that the promotion-to-
partnership tournament still serves to bond midlevel associates to the firm.
227
Yet, the model is clearly under stress. The work demands on associates appear
222. Green, supra note 116, at 20 n.55 (quoting Kenneth Standard of Esptein, Becker
& Green P.C.).
223. Amelia J. Uelmen, The Evils of "Elasticity": Reflections on the Rhetoric of
Professionalism and the Part-Time Paradox in Large Firm Practice, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
81, 83 (2005).
224. Id.
225. The commentary that suggests that "firms" adopt more humane policy is simply
too voluminous to cite. In just one example, Deborah Rhode suggests that firms adopt
"reasonable billing standards that can accommodate significant family, pro bono service, and
other personal commitments," ".broad[en] eligibility for alternative schedules, including
reduced time, flexible hours, compressed workweeks, and telecommuting," and create
"monitoring structures designed to minimize the risks associated with alternative schedules,
such as poor quality work assignments, lack of promotion opportunities, and workloads
routinely exceeding agreed limits." Deborah Rhode, Profits and Professionalism, 33
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 49, 75 (2005).
226. See, e.g., Press Release, NALP, Few Lawyers Work Part-Time, Most Who Do
Are Women (Dec. 5, 2007) (reporting that 98% of all law firm employers permit part-time
employment, though only 5.4% actually use it).
227. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text (presenting multivariate regression
results in which communication toward partnership and larger non-equity tier were factors
reducing the likelihood of midlevel associate departure).
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to be increasing, 228 thus producing higher levels of attrition. 229 At the same
time, the rapidly growing economic rewards of equity partnership are
substantially offset by its lack of permanence or the opportunity for repose.
230
According to many human resource experts, the values and preferences of
the next generation of lawyers, dubbed the Millennials, are on collision course
with the work norms of large law firms. 23 1 Millennials are defined as the
generation born after 1980 who thus began graduating from high school before
the year 2000.232 According to the standard educational timeline, the first wave
began working as summer and entry-level associates during the last three to
four years. The typical characterization of Millennial lawyers is that they
demand a high level of racial and gender diversity within the firm's
23323
workforce, are unwilling to sacrifice life and family for work,2 34 believe that
work should be fun, exciting, and high paying from day one,23 5 and are more
than willing to frankly express these views to their employer.
2 36
228. See, e.g., Dau-Schmidt et al., supra note 213, at 22 (showing that average hours
worked per year for Michigan Law graduates five years out has increased 143 hours per year
for men and 88 hours per year for women).
229. See, e.g., Fortney, supra note 116, at 283-84 (collecting sources that suggest
higher associate turnover in recent years, primarily due to higher work demands).
230. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 7, at 246-47 ("[T]he profession is undoubtedly being
collectively embarrassed by the fact that the career path to 'partnership' today provides
neither a path nor anything that resembles real partnership."); Green, supra note 116, at 24
("[B]ecoming a partner has lost some of its allure."); Rhode, supra note 225, at 72
("Particularly in large firms... full equity partnership[] typically promises no reprieve from
the punishing schedules that preceded it.").
231. See, e.g., Marci Krufka, The Young & the Restless, LAW PRACTICE, July/Aug.
2004, at 48 ("Many partners ... are unsure about--even frustrated by-the new brand of
associates."); Kathleen J. Wu, Spoiled or Special, The Over-scheduled, Over-praised
Generation Goes to Work at the Firm, TEX. LAW., May 22, 2006, at 25 ("[E]xperts in the
human resources field [believe that Millennials are] not so keen on dues-paying and menial
tasks-the kind that all associates, at least occasionally, are called upon to perform."); Lynne
C. Lancaster, A Snapshot of Generations in the Workplace Today, 1 COMPLETE LAW. (2005),
http://www.thecompletelawyer.com/volume l/issue3/article.php?artid=21 (defining
Millennials as those born after 1982 and discussing generational characteristics often at odds
with modem large law firms, such as desire for more feedback, schedule flexibility, and
additional training).
232. Krufka, supra note 231, at 49 (defining generational categories).
233. Id.
234. See supra note 142.
235. See Tricia Kasting, The "Millennial" Law Student Generation, N.J. L.J., Oct. 9,
2006, at 21 (suggesting that these impressions are rooted in mass media). At a forum of law
firm managers, law firm consultant Bruce MacEwen chronicled how many law firm partners
perceive Millennials: "The new generation of lawyers (Millenials, a/k/a Gen Y) are all about
'work/life balance,' or trying to have it all."; they "want constant feedback, a highly
structured environment (not 'sink or swim') and are intolerant of drudgery"; "[t]hey have far
less focus on a long-term career commitment to the firm"; "[b]ut are at least as smart, and far
more worldly (study abroad, living abroad, etc.) than previous generations." Adam Smith,
Esq., http://www.bmacewen.com/blog (Mar. 15, 2007, 08:34 EST).
236. Krufka, supra note 231, at 48-49 ("These children of the baby boomers have been
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Because the demand for corporate legal services continues to rise
unabated,23 7 the demands made by the Millennials cannot be hastily dismissed.
Assuming these dynamics actually produce a generational "showdown"
between entering associates and partners, it is difficult to predict who will
prevail or what a compromise might look like.238 Nonetheless, we cannot resist
the urge to speculate.
An important data point is the recently formed Law Students Building a
Better Legal Profession (BBLP), a grassroots student organization-formed in
2006 by students currently enrolled at Stanford Law School-that is urging
change among the large law firms that its members may one day join.23 9 One of
BBLP's key strategies is to compile information and rank large law firms on
metrics that matter to the group, such as pro bono participation, firm
transparency, billable hours, gender composition, diversity of the firm's
partnership, and overall firm diversity along the lines of race, gender, and
sexual orientation. 24 Because these rankings are broken down at the major city
level, students with multiple options will now have the information to make
relatively targeted decisions. If the rankings take hold, firms that ignore
BBLP's agenda will be at a considerable disadvantage in the market for
associate talent. Hence, BBLP's describes its goals as "market-based workplace
reforms."241
Thus far, the group's success has been mixed, though with recent evidence
of substantial forward moment. In April 2007, BBLP sent a letter to 100 of the
nation's largest law firms urging them to adopt the group's
recommendations. 242 Although only six firms returned the communication, the
raised to think independently and to express their beliefs openly. To an older generation of
partners, this might be perceived as discourteous or disrespectful.").
237. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
238. For some historical perspective on similar demands made on corporate law firms
by students of the late 1960s and early 1970s, see Nader, supra note 22, at 497-500.
239. See Law Students Building a Better Legal Profession,
http://refirmation.wordpress.com; see also McQuilken, supra note 21 (discussing the origins
of BBLP at Stanford Law and its goals).
240. See Law Students Building a Better Legal Profession, Our Rankings,
http://refirmation.wordpress.com/our-rankings
241. The "About Us" webpage for BBLP reads:
building a better legal profession is a national grassroots movement that seeks market-based
workplace reforms in large private law firms, by publicizing firms' self-reported data on
billable hours, pro bono participation, and demographic diversity, we draw attention to the
differences between these employers, we encourage those choosing between firms -
students deciding who to work for after graduation, corporate clients deciding who to hire,
and universities deciding who to allow on campus for interviews - to exercise their market
power and engage only with the firms that demonstrate a genuine commitment to these
issues.
Law Students Building a Better Legal Profession, About Us,
http://refirmation.wordpress.com/about-us.
242. See G.M. Fillsko, Students Aim for BigLaw Change, ABA J., Dec. 2007,
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/students-aim for biglaw change.
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group had in-person meetings with the managing partner of a national law firm,
which in turn led to a pledge to support an initiative to support a project on
attorney attrition. 243 More significantly, after extensive coverage in the
mainstream media,244 the rankings generated enormous internet traffic,
24 5
presumably from prospective law firm associates and law firm partners worried
about how their firms fared. According to the group's founders, there is ample
anecdotal evidence that students "crossed off firms from their interviews and
callbacks by seeing that they were repeatedly at the bottom of our rankings."
2 46
Yet, in assessing the long term prospects of BBLP's program, the key
analytical question is whether law firms managers have the power (a separate
question from inclination) to accede to these demands. Unfortunately, we are
skeptical. For example, one of BBLP's Principles is to replace an "hours
culture" with a "quality culture" by scuttling the billable hour in favor of
transactional billing and adopting balanced hours policies "that, without stigma,
allow associates to work 80%, 70%, or 60% of fulltime hours for proportional
pay" while keeping them on partnership track.2 47 From a purely economic
perspective, a lawyer who works 70% of the typical full-time load is unlikely to
deliver a pro rata return on his or her time because fixed overhead for office
space and support staff is not thereby proportionately reduced. Certainly, the
marginal profit is higher for the hours in excess of 2000 as opposed to 1400.
From a partner perspective, staffing projects becomes more complicated and
time-consuming. 24 8 More significantly, there is overwhelming evidence that
243. See id. (reporting that after meeting with BBLP founders, Orrick, Herrington &
Sutcliffe agreed to become a founding member of the Project for Attorney Retention at U.C.
Hastings College of the Law).
244. The group's extensive media coverage, which includes the New Republic, the
Wall Street Journal, and the L.A. Times, is collected at Law Students Building a Better Legal
Profession, Recent Press, http://refirmation.wordpress.com/recent-press.
245. According to a memorandum written by one of BBLP's founders to William
Henderson, the group's total page views jumped by over 70,000 during the prime of the fall
recruiting season. See Memorandum from Andrew Canter to William Henderson 2 (Feb. 14,
2008) (on file with author).
246. Id. at 2.
247. See Principles for a Renewed Legal Profession, Law Students Building a Better
Legal Profession, http ://refirmation.wordpress.com/principles-for-a-renewed-legal-
profession. This proposed policy mirrors a recent ABA Journal survey of law firm associates.
Among 2377 respondents, 73.4% reported practicing law five or fewer years, a figure which
suggests that Millennials comprise a large proportion of the total sample. The survey found
that associates were dissatisfied with their long work weeks. 84.2% indicated that they
would be willing to exchange lower pay for lower billable hour requirements. Moreover, the
size of the reduction sought was relatively substantial: 59.7% favored a drop of at least 15%.
The majority of respondents also reported that they would take a pay cut commensurate with
their workload reduction. Ward, supra note 142, at 24-25.
248. Some commentators, including BBLP, have argued that associates with balanced
lives produce a better work product. See Rhode, supra note 225, at 68 (reviewing
management literature and concluding that "balanced lives boost bottom lines"); Costs to the
Profession, Law Students Building a Better Legal Profession,
http://refirmation.wordpress.com/costs-to-the-profession (describing how long hours stifle
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each partner's security in the firm depends upon client relationships in a
fiercely competitive marketplace.249 Why would these folks want to confer
partnership rewards on workers whose preferences would intensify that
burden? Once again, there is no "firm" that can impose these lifestyle policies
so long as it is made up of autonomous partners who can vote with their feet.
If the law firms and the Millennials are going to strike a deal, it is
important to understand the associates' bargaining position. A law firm job can
be evaluated along a variety of dimensions, including salary and bonus,
working conditions, prestige, and value of future career options conferred by
the skills and cachet an associate has acquired. Because elite law school
graduates enjoy the most options, their career choices reveal information on the
relative importance of these attributes. As an empirical matter, these
employment patterns suggest that compensation, prestige, and outplacement
options weigh more heavily with prospective associates than attributes like
hours worked or family friendliness. 25 Since better working conditions are
already available at less elite firms in the Am Law 200, especially in smaller
markets, 25 what BBLP appears to be asking for is very high pay, very high
prestige, location in a desirable urban market, excellent career options,
reasonable promotion prospects, and sensible hours.
This is not necessarily a deal that the prestigious Wall Street firms need to
accept. Rather than reducing their hours, which may prompt partner defections,
they can rely on higher salaries and their marquee brand-a good that
associates routinely trade on to build their resumes-to coax sufficient
Millennials to join the firm.252 If firms at the top of the Vault rankings increase
creativity and promote inefficient work habits).
249. See, e.g., supra notes 219-23, and accompanying text; Fox, supra note 7, at 248
("[T]he future model of the law firm ... [based on] a now inevitable path is that law firms
will include as partner only those whose books of business exceed a very significant
number-say a million, two million, or three, depending on the firm and the city."); Green,
supra note 116, at 20 n.55 (quoting a law firm partner, "You can either practice a hundred
percent or you can stop practicing. It is very hard to practice part-time"); Kirkland, supra
note 85, at 683 (quoting one equity partner, "[T]he hours don't get any better for partners;
partners have even more pressure than associates do.").
250. Henderson & Zaring, supra note 58, at 1099 & tbl.3 (presenting data that
graduates of Top 10 law school are much more likely choose a Top 10 firm, with higher pay
and prestige, despite significantly longer hours, less family-friendly working conditions, or
worse communication toward partnership).
251. See William D. Henderson, Presentation at the 2006 Law & Society Annual
Meeting, (July 8, 2006) (presenting statistical evidence of a strong negative relationship
between hours, family friendliness, and a variety of desirable working conditions versus firm
profits and location in a major market).
252. See supra Figure 8 (showing that ratio of associate to partner pay at firms at the
95th percentile of profitability was 13.9 to 1); see also Aaron S. Haas, The Rationality of
Law Students' Career Choices (Harvard Law School Students Scholarship Series, Paper 8,
2006) (applying recent behavioral economics theories to explain why elite law school
students eventually end up favoring large firm jobs over other options despite a sense that
they will be unhappy with the choice).
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their starting salary another $20,000 and yet make no firm commitment toward
BBLP's goals, what percentage of Millennials will go with the highest prestige
job?2 53 For less profitable firms in the Am Law 200, with ratios of partner
profits to associate pay below 4.0,254 each round of the salary wars prompts
extremely difficult decisions. There is a strong perception among law firm
partners that it is crucial to match the prevailing rate for associate pay because
"otherwise, you are second-rate." 255 Yet, unless the pay raise is self-funded
through higher billable hour requirements (an outcome antithetical to BBLP's
goals) or higher billing rates (something clients will resist), firms toward the
bottom of the Am Law 200 will be more likely to lose key rainmaking partners
to upstream rivals. Of course, this only exacerbates the separation dynamic we
know is occurring between elite and semi-elite large law firms.
2 5 6
As we discussed earlier, many large firms are scrambling to meet the
market in the salary wars while aggressively seeking out new ways to offset its
financial impact. 25 7 Yet, higher salaries may be counterproductive if Millennial
lawyers do, in fact, disproportionately leave large law firms after only a few
short years of practice. Note that Millennials are not monolithic; we think that
the most elite firms will continue to peel off large number of elite law school
graduates who are willing to play by the old rules in order to start their careers
at the top of the food chain.
We foresee at least two responses by law firms that could fundamentally
transform the structure, economics, and norms of large law firm practice. First,
large law firms, particularly less elite firms under pressure from the salary
wars, can bypass Millennials from elite law schools by slightly reducing their
grade cutoffs for interviewing students from less prestigious regional law
schools. In essence, these firms would be diluting the Cravath system, which
aimed to hire the best students from the best law schools and give them the best
training. 25 Yet, there is empirical evidence that this may be a prudent strategy.
According to a recent study by Ronit Dinowitzer and Bryant Garth, based on
data from the After the JD Project, large law firm associates who graduated
from less elite law schools are (a) more satisfied with their careers, and (b)
express a lower likelihood of wanting to leave the firm.2 5 9 Because graduates
of less elite law schools are less likely to come from families with professional
253. For a persuasive economic analysis of the collective action problems that plague
law firm associates, see Renee M. Landers, James B. Rebitzer & Lowell J. Taylor, Rat Race
Redux: Adverse Selection in the Determination of Work Hours in Law Firms, 86 AM. ECON.
REv. 329 (1996).
254. See supra Figure 8.
255. Green, supra note 116, at 22 (quoting Stephen Crane, partner at Proskauer Rose
LLP and past president of the New York State Bar Association).
256. See supra Part II.D.
257. See supra notes 134-39, and accompanying text.
258. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
259. See Ronit Dinovitzer & Bryant G. Garth, Lawyer Satisfaction in the Process of
Structuring Legal Careers, 41 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 1, 12-13 & fig.2 (2007).
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or advantaged backgrounds, Dinowitzer and Garth suggest that large law firm
employment delivers a much greater sense of accomplishment and mobility
than that experienced by their counterparts from elite law schools. 260 One law
firm consultant recently reported several firms he has talked with "have been
pleasantly surprised by the performance of some experimental new hires from
the top of their class at 'lesser' ranked law schools."
2 61
To deal with the exigency of high Millennial-lawyer attrition, the second
major transformation could be the emergence of a law firm that operates like a
corporation, scuttling the promotion-to-partnership tournament and basing its
hiring and promotion policies on each lawyer's marginal product. A firm
operating on this model--once again, probably a semi-elite firm looking for
refuge from the salary wars-would not be "selling" the elite credentials of its
lawyers. Rather, it would be developing firm-specific capital by focusing on
business processes that deliver high-quality legal services at a cost-effective
and predictable price. 262 Lawyers would be employees with salaries lower than
their elite Wall Street counterparts; but they would also enjoy sensible hours
that permit a better work-family balance-a combination of salary, prestige,
and hours that is often found in in-house legal departments. 263 Promotions
would not be based on a multiyear tournament but on a lawyer's ability to
profitably manage client matters, often taken a flat-fee basis or another
nonhourly alternative.2 64 Demonstrated management and teamwork skills
resulting in successful client engagements would carry more weight than Ivy
League credentials. Further, a focus on job performance may be an ideal
environment to develop the talents and abilities and women and minority
attorneys, 265 who have not fared well in a tracked and seeded promotion-to-
260. See id at 23 ("[F]or many of the graduates of lower-tier law schools, gaining
entry to the legal profession is part of the project of upward mobility.").
261. Ward Bower, The War for Talent and Starting Salaries, REP. TO LEGAL MGMT.
(Altman Weil, Inc., Newton Square, Pa.), Apr. 2007, at 2, available at
http://www.altmanweil.com/dirdocs/resource/aa26ed0a-08e 1-422b-8605-6e42e944bb92_
document.pdf. Researchers who studied engineers at the world famous Bell Labs during the
1980s also discovered that the organization's most valuable engineers did not have higher
measures of cognitive or social ability, but that several work habits (including intellectual
humility) consistently produced the best results for the company. See Robert Kelley & Janet
Caplan, How Bell Labs Creates Star Performers, HARV. Bus. REv., July-Aug. 1993, at 128.
262. General counsel from elite Fortune 100 corporations are indeed aggressively
looking for value propositions that are outside the traditional law firm business model. See,
e.g., Posting of John Earnhardt to The Platform: The Official Cisco Blog,
http://blogs.cisco.com/news (Jan. 25, 2007, 14:13 PST).
263. See, e.g., Dau-Schmidt et al., supra note 210, at 34 (analyzing lawyer satisfaction
data for Indiana Law alumni and noting that corporate counsel positions may provide good
income, job satisfaction, and work/life balance).
264. Corporate clients are definitely interested in high-quality legal services at a
predictable price. See, e.g., Debra Cassen Weiss, Clients May Help End Billing by the Hour,
ABA J., Jan. 2, 2007, http://www.abajournal.com/news/clients-may help_
end billable hours.
265. Cf. Kelley & Caplan, supra note 261, at 137 (discussing how women and
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partnership tournament.
266
Although general counsel may favor elite law firms for bet-the-company
matters, this new business model could make substantial in-roads for higher
volume, price-sensitive corporate work. And if nonlawyers could capitalize and
share profits with law firms-an idea that is now a reality in Australia and
coming soon to England-there would be ample funds to experiment with this
267new model. More importantly, the resulting business model would
emphasize development of firm-specific capital, blunting the damage that could
be done through lateral mobility and providing firm management with
opportunities to develop secure and valuable niche markets.
CONCLUSION
Under the new "elastic" tournament, a much larger proportion of lawyers
will begin and end their careers as employees of the firm, expanding the ranks
of permanent associates, senior associates, of counsel, and permanent non-
equity partners. Whether this model will be fundamentally "stable" in the
economic sense remains to be seen. In the meanwhile, it raises several
philosophical and practical issues regarding the character of the legal
profession, lawyer independence and the long-term viability of professional
self-regulation.
The large law firm as social, cultural, and professional institution has an
enormous and disproportionate influence on the legal profession.268 Until now,
it has been regarded as a larger, more complex, perhaps more proficient and
exemplary version of the ordinary firm providing legal services-like the
others, only more so. But our detailed examination of market trends suggests
that large law firms are actually on the brink of becoming something different.
As firms give up the ideal of employee-ownership/autonomy for most of their
members, the firm becomes paradoxically more "corporate" (in the sense of
control by a bureaucratic hierarchy unaccountable to subordinates) for most of
the employee lawyers, but less corporate (in the sense of set apart and unified
by loyalty) for the owner partners. Indeed, within the inner core of owners as
within the outer mantle of non-equity partners, of counsel and other lawyers,
there is an endless competition to improve or protect one's relative standing in
the firm. The thinner firm culture produced by sheer firm size and geographic
dispersion cannot contain the centripetal dynamic of internal competition
minorities posted largest productivity gains as a result of training based on the work habits of
the Bell Lab's most productive workers).
266. See supra Part III.B.
267. For a thought-provoking exchange on these developments by three veteran law
firm observers, see Milton Regan, Larry Ribstein & Bruce MacEwan, Law Firms, Ethics,
and Equity Capital: A Conversation, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 61 (2008), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=98535 1.
268. See supra note 27.
1928 [Vol. 60:1867
April 2008] THE ELASTIC TOURNAMENT 1929
supercharged by the constant threat of mobility. So money becomes the
primary glue holding the firms together-an outcome that flows from the
structural features of the modem legal marketplace and that attenuates the
professional ideals of most lawyers.
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